Date:
Tue, 31 Jan 2006 09:08:55 -0500
From:
David Cheifetz
Subject:
Young v Bella 2006 SCC 3
Young
is another example of an unusual SCC analysis.
Young
sustained psychiatric injury, but not physical injury, as a result
of the defendant's negligence. She was fully compensated for her
pecuniary losses. She also received an award for her non-pecuniary
general damages. The amount, $439,000 was greater than cap - probably
about $250-275K then though I didn't check. Nonetheless, the SCC
held that the cap did not apply.
In
my view, it's explanation why, in para 65 and 66, does not make
sense. The only difference between Young's case and "ordinary"
catastrophic injury cases is that she did not suffer a "physical"
injury due to the defendants' negligence (with or without psychiatric
injury), she sustained only psychiatric injury. So what? If we apply
Young for what it logically means, it stands for damages
proposition that the a jury award can exceed the cap so long as
the amount of the excess is not so great as to shock the conscience
of the court.
Young,
until it's overruled or limited, means it's lawyers' negligence,
in Canada, for any lawyer to sue personal injury claims if a jury
is allowed under applicable provincial law.
The
duty of care discussion commencing in Young at para 28-32
reads like a retreat from Cooper v Hobart's refinement
of the analysis stage analysis. The factors the SCC mentions in
paras 29-32 which arise out of the professor-student relationship
- as emphasized in para 31 and so, in the Cooper framework,
are to be considered at the 1st stage of whether to recognize the
prima facie duty of care. They're not the 2nd stage issues touching
on "the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal
obligations, the legal system and society more generally".
Who cares if the university argued them as 2nd stage policy issues?
The SCC is supposed to get the law right.
David
Cheifetz
Bennett Best Burn LLP
-----
Original Message -----
From: Neil Foster
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2006 7:50 PM
Subject: ODG: Young v Bella
Dear
Colleagues; I
found the Supreme Court of Canada decision on 27 Jan 2006 in Young
v Bella 2006 SCC 3 fascinating. For those who haven't
come across it yet - in a bizarre set of circumstances a Uni social
work student who submitted an essay on child sexual abuse with
an appendix containing a "first person account" by an
abuser (which she had copied without proper footnoting from a
book) was suspected by her lecturer of being a child abuser. Without
her knowledge this suspicion was reported to child welfare authorities
who put her on a "black list" and hence (not surprisingly)
she had problems getting work in the field after graduating! She
sued in defamation and negligence when the error had been discovered,
and while the action in defamation failed she was awarded some
$840,000 in damages in negligence, a verdict which the SCC upheld.
As
an academic at the beginning (here in Australia) of the academic
year the case is a good reminder of the importance of taking my
responsibility for student welfare seriously; eg
34
Those whose professional responsibilities include the exercise of
such power over the careers and future lives of fee-paying students
are required to take the necessary care to get their facts straight
before taking a potential career-ending action in relation to a
student.
It
is a salutary exercise to read the account of how the accusation
snowballed from a "gut feeling" of the student's lecturer.
More
to the point for this list I would be interested in other's comments
on the tort questions raised. The SCC accepts at [56] that a case
in negligence is possible despite it looking like a classic defamation
case, and this is a question the High Court of Australia hasn't
definitively addressed. But we do have the decision in Sullivan
v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 from a few years ago rejecting
a negligence claim in a case of reporting child sexual abuse,
and at para [54] of the majority judgement strongly hinting that
a negligence claim could not be brought where defamation was the
"proper" claim. (I see from Balkin & Davis 3rd ed
at 546-547 that in NZ a similar view has been taken in Midland
Metals Overseas Pte Ltd v Christchurch Press Co Ltd [2002]
2 NZLR 289.)
I must say that I think, however, that even the HCA might have
upheld the decision in Young v Bella - as the SCC says,
there should be protection against suit if there is reason to
report even something which is just a suspicion, but here there
was not even enough material to have a reasonable suspicion! I
suppose the case may raise the defamation/negligence clash in
this way- that is, was the defamation claim rejected because the
report was in some sense made under claim of "qualified privilege"?
Should this aspect of the defamation law have been able to be
circumvented in the negligence claim? I tend to think (without
doing the work to check this out yet!) that a defence of qualified
privilege should also have failed here.
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