Date:
Thu, 4 May 2006 13:30:17 -0600
From:
Lewis Klar
Subject:
Childs v. Desormeaux
I
thought I was finished but Stephen drew me back in.
I
am not sure if Stephen intended to state that I reject his notion
that as fellow human beings we have moral duties to help each other
and if we unreasonably fail to do so, we fail in our duty. Because
if he did mean this, he is incorrect, I am totally with him. I was
discussing legal duties, and more specifically tort law duties.
I was not referring to moral duties or even to statutorily imposed
duties; only tort duties.
For
what it is worth, I am a pretty caring guy and believe that we all
have moral duties to help each other out. What I reject, and I think
he knows this, is the creation of legal duties to assist by common
law judges in tort, based only on their own personal moral values,
with assistance from counsel to lead them onto the right path in
case the judge goes morally astray, in private causes of action
in tort. There are lots of reasons why I believe this, but that
is for another time.
As
for letting the drunk off, I agree that the drunk is not let off.
The drunk has to pay for the damage done, even if someone else gas
to pay as well. We are all agreed on that.
As
for Richard Wright's point that to try to separate the party from
the after party, as I tried to do, does not work, let me reply.
I agree it does not work if you include in the activity of "hosting"
the party, the additional responsibility of seeing that everyone
gets home safely. The same for driving a car. If you consider part
of the responsibilities of driving a car carefully, the responsibility
to stay and help out if there is an accident, even if the driver
actually drove carefully, then a driver who does not stay has breached
his or her duty. But that begs the question. What does "hosting"
or "driving carefully" entail? Why is it the host's responsibility
as host to make sure everyone gets home safely, even if the host
took every conceivable precaution to ensure that the drinking at
the party was reasonable? Is it because the host "created the
risk" by hosting a party? The same could be said of the person
who supplied the alcohol, the person who invited the drunk to the
party, the persons who helped organize the party, and so on. Why
draw the line at the host? Unless the host's negligence was the
effective cause of the ultimate accident which distinguishes the
host from everyone else I mention, the host is a mere stranger (legally
speaking, not theologically or morally). And yes, for the record
I agree that everyone has a moral duty to do something about the
drunk, and if they do not, it is shameful. Maybe society through
its elected representatives should do something about it and pass
a law!
Lewis
Klar
University of Alberta
>>>
"Stephen D. Sugarman" 05/04/06 12:02 AM >>>
RE:
ODG: Childs v. Desormeaux
I
think that it would be better to start with the position that duties
arise from relationships and that as fellow humans we have moral
duties to help each other. If we unreasonably fail to do so, we
fail in our duty. I have a pretty good sense that Lewis rejects
this idea and believes instead that we start with no duties to any
fellow human and that no one ought to be able to complain about
our failing to help them. Their only complaint can be that we affirmatively
carelessly hurt them. Ben and John probably think this way too.
Yet, those with this view latter would allow for some exceptions
where there are special undertakings, or special relationships.
I am pretty confident of that.
Even
under my approach, there may well be good reasons why tort law should
not make it a legally enforceable duty to help others. And those
reasons may apply most forcefully when our relationship to another
person is thinnest (so-called stranger cases). But all of the hypos
being considered here seem to involve people with thick relationships
-- host/guest, friend/friend, drink provider/drinker, often all
of them. Those seem to me to be quite suitable grounds for asking
one to take steps to help the other.
And
one way of helping is to take reasonable steps to prevent the person
from doing the terrible act of harming yet another person through
drunk driving.
Again,
there may be good reasons why we might not want to make it a legal
duty to interfere to try to prevent the drunk driving accident.
But, I'd like to have our attention focus on them.
In
general, no duty reasons, in my view, can include the idea that
in this setting there is a trumping social value at stake that would
be trampled if a legal duty were imposed. But frankly the liberty
of the host simply to ignore the peril a friend and guest is likely
to create is not a value I'd give great weight to. (Lewis might
find it offensive for the law to seem to let the drunk off; yet
surely we could agree that the drunk would have to indemnify the
host, if financially able, and hence have primary responsibility
fall on the drunk.)
Another
reason for no duty is what I call perverse behavioral responses
to legal duties. If we really believed that large numbers of people
would stop being social towards each other in fearful reaction to
the creation of a tort duty, then that might be a convincing reason
not to impose it. Or if we believed that a lot more people would
get drunk and depend on hosts to look out for them if we imposed
a legal duty, that too might be a reason not to impose the duty
(although I am highly skeptical about the reliability of claims
like this).
Some
might find it sufficient grounds for a no duty rule that they are
convinced that the host will not take any precautions despite the
legal duty and/or that they are convinced that too many hosts will
find themselves bankrupted leading to a great deal of social disruption
(although I am skeptical about the reliability of this sort of claim).
And so on.
It
was just this sort of back and forth argument that makes Tarasoff
so stimulating. Maybe the California Supreme Court was right in
refusing to conclude that the psychiatrist had no duty to take some
responsibility for the behavior of his/her client; or maybe it was
wrong and that there are convincing reasons not to attach legal
duties to this relationship.
But
once you recognize that some sorts of relationships clearly give
rise to what others are calling affirmative legal duties, it becomes
necessary in my view to argue why they should not also apply in
the case before us (or why they should apply in the case before
us). And, in this context, I suggest, the labels nonfeasance and
misfeasance are not helpful. Surely the hotel clerk has a duty to
warn the hotel guest when a fire breaks out, even though failing
to do so is nonfeasance. Maybe commercial relationships like this
are more suitable for legal duties because hotel clerks can be trained
to do the right thing and because there is a clear social understanding
that when you go to sleep in a hotel the hotel operators will take
precautions to protect you. But then let's talk about whether the
social host setting is sufficiently like that of the hotel or not,
and why.
I
realize that my examples here focus on protecting the guest and
not a third party (Tarasoff aside) but that misses the
point in my view. If you loan your car to someone and they injure
someone else, I have no problem saying that you owe the third party
a duty because it is your car, just as you might be said to owe
a duty to the victim of the drunk driver in the social host setting
a duty because it was your booze, or your home in which it was drunk,
or your friend who got drunk.
Note,
of course, in the lending the car setting, this is not strict liability
and so P must show that you acted unreasonably -- like loaning it
to someone who is drunk.
Finally,
if we are prepared to hold liable in tort someone who loans his
car to a person who is drunk when that drunk goes out and carelessly
runs over the plaintiff, then just why is it exactly that we should
be so hesitant to hold liable someone whose booze makes the person
drunk and who makes no effort to send the drunk home in the car
of a sober guest or in a taxi?
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