Date:
Wed, 9 Aug 2006 23:57:45 -0400
From:
David Cheifetz
Subject:
Law's (Il)logic
I'm
looking for judicial statements about logic or appropriate methods
of legal reasoning which trigger a double-take, which make one ask
oneself "did the judge(s) really mean what the written words
mean?".
For
example, in Haag v. Marshall (1989) 39 B.C.L.R. (2d) 205,
61 D.L.R. (4th) 371, [1990] 1 W.W.R. 361 (B.C.C.A.) the court expressly
stated that judicial reasoning need not be logical (by any meaning
of logic) and yet will still be based on common sense and justice.
Where
a breach of duty has occurred, and damage is shown to have arisen
within the area of risk which brought the duty into being, and
where the breach of duty materially increased the risk that damage
of that type would occur, and where it is impossible, in a practical
sense, for either party to lead evidence which would establish
either that the breach of duty caused the loss or that it did
not, then it is permissible to infer, as a matter of legal,
though not necessarily logical, inference, that the material
increase in risk arising from the breach of duty constituted a
material contributing cause of the loss and as such a foundation
for a finding of liability.
(213
BCLR - underlining added)
Then
the court when on to state that whether that sort of "logical"
inference should be made depends on whether it would be "in
accordance with common sense and justice" (213) Putting this
together, we have the court telling us that, for law, a common sense
and just conclusion can be one which is not logical; that is, irrational.
The
court didn't explain how the universe of inferences which are not
logical can be anything other than irrational and how an irrational
inference can be one based on common sense and justice.
Let's
call this a whopper of a legal fiction and leave it at that, for
now, even though the court didn't suggest that it was employing
the fiction device by deeming this approach to be "logical".
(Legal fiction is as good as any explanation for the Wilsher/Snell
robust inference approach).
The
higher up the pecking-order and the more explicit the better, of
course.
Thanks,
David
Cheifetz
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