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Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2006 15:33:28 +0100

From: Hector MacQueen

Subject: Law's (Il)logic

 

Perhaps worth adding to the list of "logic" quotes the following from the Lord President (as he then was) Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in the First Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session in the Piper Alpha case -

However logical such an argument may be, it does not represent the law. The life of the Civil Law, no less than of the Common Law, "has not been logic: it has been experience."

 

Hector

--
Hector L MacQueen
Professor of Private Law
Director, AHRC Research Centre Intellectual Property and Technology Law Edinburgh Law School University of Edinburgh Edinburgh EH8 9YL UK
Tel: (0)131-650-2060; Fax: (0)131-662-6317

 

Quoting David Cheifetz:

Ken, Steve:

While it's possible to read the Haig statement to mean that Lambert JA was referring only to deductive reasoning, not inductive reasoning, I think that's a too kind reading - not the least because the case is an early example of the argument that material increase in risk is a sufficient material contribution to amount to probable cause. There may have been and may now be some logical content to the English version of that test. The Canadian version means nothing or everything (simultaneously).

I agree that a conclusion reached without the aid of logic isn't necessarily illogical. But being able to show that it's logical (inductively or deductively) if you've reached the conclusion without the aid of either form of logic is different.

What's left? (We have, of course, the gap the HL leaped in Fairchild.) That is, it is still possible that conclusion may be logical but one has no analytically valid basis for saying it probably is. So, if one says the conclusion "probably" is correct, one is asserting that proposition based on (ahem) faith.

And if I can rely on "common sense" inferences not supported by any form of logic, what's the basis for restricting my reliance to common sense?

Law has to (formally) deny that is analytical procedures are based on, a priori, faith, right? If it admitted that, it would make law's process no more valid than religion.

In Haig, the court was dealing with the issue of finding of factual cause which has to be made on a more probable than not basis and his ultimate point was an early version of Fairchild as it was before Barker v Corus "Wilsherised" (coining a verb) it; that is, that evidence which established nothing more than that conduct increased the risk of some harm occurring was evidence that that conduct was a cause of the harm - an early Canadian leap over Jane Stapleton's gap. I don't think the case can be read to mean just that the court acknowledged that evidence wasn't actual proof of cause but would be deemed to be evidence of actual cause.

 


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