Date:
Thu, 9 Nov 2006 18:25:24
From:
Michael Jones
Subject:
Claimants' contributory fault, policy, and public authority "impecuniosity"
David,
I
take your point about the seat belt, but I wonder how far back in
time we would be prepared to go in identifying the claimant's fault?
If, as a young man I had been in an accident as a result of my own
negligence causing me to have the "thin skull" - let's
say a "dodgy" leg liable to give way under me. 30 years
later the negligent defendant causes me to fall down some stairs,
but if my leg had not been "dodgy" I might have been able
to avoid the injury or some of its severity - am I contributorily
negligent? The seat belt is easier because it is obvious to all
what the precaution is meant to avoid, and the harm it is designed
to avoid has an immediacy with respect to the damage. On standard
principles my "dodgy" leg is irrelevant to the defendant's
liability; on your approach then perhaps my earlier negligence should
be factored in?
Incidentally,
I've just remembered the one English case which is (sort-of) similar
to my doctor-patient example, though it is only a county court decision
and therefore of no authority. In Pidgeon v Doncaster Health
Authority [2002] Lloyd’s Rep Med 130 the claimant developed
cervical cancer, having negligently been informed, incorrectly,
that the results of the smear test were negative. She failed to
have further smear tests (which should have identified the cancer
and therefore treatment would have commenced much earlier than it
did), despite frequent reminders. The patient was held to have been
two-thirds contributorily negligent.
Michael
--------------------------------------
Michael A. Jones
Professor of Common Law
Liverpool Law School
University of Liverpool
Liverpool
L69 3BX
Phone:
(0)151 794 2821
Fax: (0)151 794 2829
--------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------
From: DAVID CHEIFETZ
Sent: Thu 09/11/2006 17:36
To: Jones, Michael
Cc: David Cheifetz
Subject: Re: Claimants' contributory fault, policy, and public authority
"impecuniosity"
Michael,
There
is duty, breach and causal link.
The
analogy fits. Your distinction between actions against the consultant
and a third person is an apt one. If it's correct, and it's correct
to categorize the case as a "thin-skull" type, that's
the end of a valid basis for complaining about the claimant's conduct.
I
mention, in passing, that there's also an inevitability argument
in my case - it was merely a matter of when, not if - but that's
both factual and merely another way of phrasing the volenti point.
But there's also another "but" that's better in principle
in an apportionment, not single "legal cause" context.
It's a "but" because, I think, there's tension between
the analyses underlying "thin-skull" and contributory
fault. Or, maybe I think there is in this case because I'm too deeply
into the area and can't see the forest, etc.
I
think it isn't a complete answer in the third person situation now
that jurisprudence (common law or statute) has junked last clear
chance / ultimate fault style arguments. That's because the analysis
- the take the injured person as one finds him/her/it, aka "crumbling
skull" - is, in my view, one logical result of the old contributory
fault absolute bar. The consequences of pre-existing contributory
fault are as much an aspect of the claimant's condition as consequences
which aren't due to "misconduct". (We've recognized that
for seat-belts: see below).
Maybe,
too, we have to differentiate between "ought to have"
negligence and a conscious decision not to do that which you've
been told you ought to do.
Let's
go back to your example an assume we're dealing with the action
against the motorist. In one example, our couch potato was "only"
negligent in the way he/she attempted to carry out the doctor's
prescription. In the other, he/she intentionally chose not to.
Or,
in an example we're all more familiar with, the decision was not
to wear a seat belt and the injuries would have been less if it
had been worn. I don't think any of us know of a reported decision
where a judge said the defendant has to take the plaintiff as he
or she was (unseat-belted).
I
don't see why I can't, in principle analogize the situation to the
failure to wear a seat-belt. If I can, the argument is about the
comparative extents of fault, not if there's contributory fault
at all.
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