-----Original Message-----
From: Lionel Smith
Sent: February 15, 2007 12:20 PM
Subject: ODG: Waiver of tort: Heward v. Eli Lilly & Co.
This
case is now on canlii.
At
[25] we find this:
"In
attempting to formulate coherent principles that would explain and
rationalise past decisions to accommodate the relatively recent
recognition of a general law of restitution, there is no doubt that
the learned commentators have greatly contributed to, and will quite
properly continue to influence, its development. However, as the
reasons of Epstein J. indicate, their views have not been uniform
despite the enviable degree of confidence with which they have sometimes
been asserted."
But
it is not only the academics who get sideswiped:
[14]:
"The case for certifying the proceeding was very strongly,
and comprehensibly, contested by counsel for the defendants on the
basis of the evidence and the authorities. They left no stone unturned
and, in my opinion, turned over quite a few that were extraneous
to the case presented on behalf of the plaintiffs."
Overall
there is a good review of different road maps of restitution but
because this is only a certification application, the judge does
not need to pick one, only deciding that it is arguable that a claim
in negligence might lead to a gain-based remedy, and [38] that "it
is not plain and obvious that a claim based on waiver of tort must
satisfy the three-part test for unjust enrichment". While he
concludes that it is arguable that unjust enrichment can be established
without showing any deprivation, he decides that in a case where
the only facts pleaded involve negligence, there is no room for
a separate claim in unjust enrichment.
Unfortunately
these class actions rarely go trial in Canada -- they tend to settle
after certification -- so we may never get actual decisions on the
points that he decided were arguable.
Neil,
what did you find objectionable in the judgment? Is it that you
agreed with the BCSC in Reid, that there can be no gain-based
claim for negligence?
That
may well be right, but Reid seems much less thorough than
this judgment; Gerow J simply assumed there that all gain-based
claims are claims in unjust enrichment (which in my view is inconsistent
with Soulos v Korkontzilas). In the earlier discussion
on the RDG of Cullity J's other judgments, some people read him
as saying that waiver of tort is an independent cause of action;
I don't think this new judgment is open to that criticism. He is
not deciding whether waiver of tort is (a) a gain-based claim for
a wrong or (b) part of unjust enrichment, but I don't think he can
be read as saying that it is neither one.
I
do think that in [64] Cullity J. may have misunderstood Peter Birks'
position.