Richard states
"Because the defendant is trying to escape liability, despite tortious
causation of the harm, within the normal scope of liability, merely because
of the fortuity that it would have happened anyway due to nontortious
causes. While I support that limitation on legal responsibility given my
understanding of the principles of justice, I think the defendant should not
be allowed to do so based on such fortuity unless it is at least 'clear and
convincing' that it would have happened anyway, rather than being a mere
probability or minimal belief that it would have happened anyway. "


(i) Why (as a matter of principle) do you think this?
(ii) Do you think this principle should apply outside of the law of torts?
So should a claim for breach of contract for loss which would probably have
been suffered regardless of any breach, be recoverable unless the party in
breach can show clearly and convincingly that it would have happened anyway?
Should the same principle apply in the criminal law?
(iii) "Scope of responsibility" is surely better than "scope of liability".
Limitation periods, for example, also fix the scope of liability. We are
asking what the defendant is responsible for, and that will determine the
scope of his liability (as will a number of other unrelated things).
Liability is not a synonym for responsibility.

I still remain of the view if X would have happened anyway, regardless of Y,
Y did not cause X, and that it is at very best counter-intuitive to describe
this as a concern of 'scope of liability' rather than causation.