From: Neil Foster
<neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>
Sent: Wednesday 11 December 2024
01:13
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: ODG: HCA on proportionate
liability for breach of building duty
Dear Colleagues;
This week seems to be private law week at the High Court of Australia.
All 4 cases involve private law in different contexts, though I will be
commenting only on two that I most directly interested in. (The ones I will not
be commenting on today are Kramer
v Stone [2024] HCA 48 (11 Dec 2024), in what looks like an interesting
decision on proprietary estoppel, and Commonwealth
of Australia v Sanofi [2024] HCA 47 (11 Dec 2024), which I had thought was
about patents but looks to be more about how an appellate court deals with
facts found by a lower court. I leave it to others to comment on these.)
In this first email, I want to note the decision in Pafburn
Pty Limited v The Owners - Strata Plan No 84674 [2024] HCA 49 (11
Dec 2024), which concerns issues around statutory duties imposed on builders
and whether the proportionate liability regime applies to such claims. (My
second email will note the fourth decision, about contract damages for psychological
harm.)
Pafburn will be mainly of interest to NSW colleagues, but the issues may come
up in other contexts elsewhere. In our State, the Design and Building
Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) ("DBPA") was introduced
following a series of scandals about defective buildings, especially in
high-rise apartments, and the decision of the High Court in Brookfield
Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR
185 that the original developer of a high rise building did not owe a
duty of care in the law of negligence to subsequent purchasers. The DBPA
provides that a duty is owed to subsequent owners (s 37(2)), and it also
provides that the duty is to be treated as if the duty were a duty established
by the common law (s 37(3)). It then says in s 39 that "A person who owes
a duty of care under this Part is not entitled to delegate that duty."
In this litigation a building developer and a builder, having been sued
for economic loss, claimed that they should be able reduce their own liability
by invoking the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Part
4, which provides for a regime of proportionate liability in economic loss
and property damage claims. Part 4 abolished the usual common principle of
solidary liability , under which a plaintiff can sue any tortfeasor who is has
materially contributed to their loss for 100% of the damages, leaving it up to
the tortfeasor to find others who may be joined or sued for contribution.
Instead, where Part 4 applies, each tortfeasor can only be sued for the precise
proportion they have contributed to the loss.
In the Court of Appeal, it was held that Part 4 of the CLA did not apply
to claims under the DBPA, through a three-step process of reasoning.
The High Court by majority agreed with the Court of Appeal (GAGELER CJ,
GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ). They in effect (with some complications not
mentioned) adopted the above reasoning.
[58] Section 39(a) of the CLA also operates to ensure that nothing in Pt
4 of the CLA "prevents a person from being held vicariously liable for a
proportion of anyapportionable claim for which another person is liable".
In the case of the liability of a defendant for a wrongdoer under s 5Q, that
proportion for the defendant is necessarily 100% of the liability.
I myself think the majority are correct- this is both a plausible
reading of the legislation and also seems to represent good policy, that
Parliament would not intend unit owners to have to pursue multiple businesses
to recover full compensation.
As someone who has written about non-delegable duty (see here
for those interested) I appreciated the clarity of what the majority said about
the issue, see eg
[20] the content of the duty is personally to ensure
that that other person performing the function in fact takes reasonable care. Liability for breach of a non-delegable duty,
therefore, is generally considered to be "direct" or
"personal" liability (because the person subject to the non-delegable
duty is taken to have breached that duty by not ensuring that reasonable care
was taken by the other person performing the function) rather than
"vicarious" liability.
Colleagues who teach Torts may also appreciate that we get a brief
definition of the term!
[21] "Tort" is a concept of significant
elasticity and indeterminacy which extends to any form of wrong which attracts
a remedy in civil law and not within another recognised class of actionable
wrongs (such as breach of contract or breach of trust).
The dissent disagrees (GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ). Of course there
are plausible points that they make, but I still think on balance the majority
are correct.
Regards
Neil
NEIL FOSTER
Associate Professor, School of Law and Justice
College of Human and Social Futures,
University of Newcastle, NSW
T: +61 2 49217430
E: neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
Further details: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/profile/neil-foster
My publications: http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/ , http://ssrn.com/author=504828
Blog: https://lawandreligionaustralia.blog
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