From: Neil Foster <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>
Sent: Thursday 15 February 2024 01:24
To: Robert Stevens; Stéphane Sérafin; Jason W Neyers;
obligations
Subject: Re: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Dear Colleagues;
Thanks for an interesting discussion! I note
that similar, though not the same, issues were discussed by the High Court of
Australia in Arsalan
v Rixon; Nguyen v Cassim [2021] HCA 40. That case involved the question
whether damages following a car accident included, not just the cost of a
functional replacement vehicle while repairs were being carried, but also
extended to a replacement vehicle of similar “prestige” to the damaged car. The
answer was yes.
At [3]:
Recovery of damages under these heads
of damage will usually be necessary to restore the plaintiff to the position
they would have been in but for the defendant's actions that caused the
accident. Once the plaintiff acts to mitigate that loss by hiring a substitute
vehicle, the onus of proof will lie upon the defendant to show that the costs
incurred in mitigation were unreasonable.
But the court did not comment on other
issues, including the one raised in Armstead. They said at [4] issues
they were not discussing included:
the extent to which particular hire
expenses, such as credit hire charges, can be said to have been incurred in
mitigation of the losses; and the extent to which the quantum of hire costs is
otherwise shown to be unreasonable.
I think the Armstead decision seems
right. However, I note that the analysis includes reference to a doctrine which
is part of UK law but no longer part of the common law of Australia. Lord
Leggatt and Lord Burrows say at [20]:
someone
who negligently causes physical damage to another person’s property is not
liable to pay compensation to a third party claimant who suffers financial loss
as a result of the damage. (See also [27]).
In Australia this (as a general exclusionary
rule) has not been the law since Caltex v The Dredge Willmstad (1976)
136 CLR 529 and in particular more recently since Perre v Apand (1999)
198 CLR 180. But the difference in approach on this point makes no difference
here, since clearly we have a case of property damage (not “pure” economic
loss) of an item possessed by the claimant, and the debate is about the limits
of the damages award that can be given. I am pretty sure the same result would
follow in Australia as in Armstead here.
I also appreciated the comments at [39]-[40]
distinguishing The Winkfield and noting why the decision in that case
did not answer the question here. In a way the case here was the opposite of The
Winkfield. There, the bailee (the PMG) could recover full damages from the
tortfeasor for conversion of the property he possessed, and those damages were
not limited by the fact that his relationship with the bailors (those who had
despatched the mail) limited his liability to account to them. Here we
have a bailee entitled to recover damages for (in effect) conversion of the
chattel she possessed, and the question is whether the damages she can recover extend
to the contractual obligation she has to pay an extra amount to her bailor.
Subject to legitimate concerns about remoteness (which I agree here can be
analysed as whether the obligation to pay stems from “a genuine and reasonable
attempt to assess the likely losses”), that seems fair.
Regards
Neil
NEIL FOSTER
Associate
Professor, Newcastle School of Law and Justice
College
of Human and Social Futures
T:
+61 2 49217430
E:
neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
Further
details: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/profile/neil-foster
My
publications: http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/ , http://ssrn.com/author=504828
Blog: https://lawandreligionaustralia.blog
The University of Newcastle
Hunter St & Auckland St, Newcastle NSW 2300
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emerging.
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in which the Newcastle City campus resides and which I work.
CRICOS Provider 00109J
From: Robert
Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Date: Thursday, 15 February 2024 at 7:06 am
To: Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>,
"jneyers@uwo.ca" <jneyers@uwo.ca>, "obligations@uwo.ca" <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Sorry
“that the *claimant* was the author of his own misfortune in going down
stairs without a handrail”
As a reviewer noted, I always muddle up my claimants and defendants.
From: Robert Stevens
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 8:02 PM
To: Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>;
Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>;
obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Answer to
Stéphane: it is just, so long as the damages don’t exceed the ordinary loss that
you can reasonably foresee, which in turn can be answered by asking whether the
clause was a reasonable pre-estimate of the loss of use an owner will incur
while the vehicle is being repaired.
If the clause were not a reasonable pre-estimate of loss but were still
enforceable under the new Makdessi “legitimate interest” rule, I don’t
think such extra loss should be recoverable. Contra Jason, I don’t think
drivers can reasonably foresee that such contractual loss will be incurred.
FWIIW, I agree with Jason that some of what is said about burden of
proof is doubtful. I don’t think, for example, that in McKew v Holland
the claimant had any prima facie claim for his broken ankle. It
shouldn’t have been for the defendant to have pleaded and proved that although
the tort they had committed was a necessary cause of the broken ankle, that the
defendant was the author of his own misfortune in going down stairs without a
handrail. The claim should fail in relation to the ankle without the defendant
pleading and proving anything.
From: Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 7:46 PM
To: Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>;
Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>;
obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Re: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
I think the special difficulty in this
case is that the contract between, effectively, the bailor and the bailee
altered the extent of the claim that the bailor would normally have against the
bailee. Under those circumstances, is it really just to impose further
liability on a third party, who was not bound by or even had knowledge of the
special arrangements?
From: Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>
Sent: February 14, 2024 2:43 PM
To: robert.stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>; obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Attention : courriel externe | external email
Having
just skimmed over the decision, isn’t the answer, that in a world in which
rights to use property can be sub-divided (through leases and bailments and
contracts), one of the reasons why it is negligent to damage property is that
this might cause the owner to lose out on a valuable opportunity to let another
use the property or might cause a bailee/leasee (sub-user) owe damages
to the owner?
So I’m not
sure why we have to rely on concepts such as “unforeseeable loses” being “recoverable
so long as no higher than the ordinary loss that would be foreseeable”.
But perhaps I am missing something?
Jason Neyers
Professor of Law
Faculty of Law
Western University
Law Building Rm 26
e. jneyers@uwo.ca
t. 519.661.2111 (x88435)
From: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 1:42 PM
To: obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
An
interesting case on remoteness of loss decided by the UK Supreme Court today: Armstead
v RSI [2024] UKSC 6, rightly overturning a decision of the Court of Appeal.
Lords Leggatt and Burrows give the lead judgment, with which Lord Richards and
Lady Simler concur, with a brief concurrence by Lord Briggs.
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2022-0100.html
A car was
hired by the claimant, and negligently damaged by the defendant. Under the
terms of the agreement between the claimant and the hire company, the claimant
is liable for costs of repairs, and to pay a daily hire rate up to a maximum of
30 days for every day the vehicle is being repaired. The claimant herself never
incurred any costs of repairs nor did she ever suffer any loss of use during
the period of hire. Could the claimant recover as damages her contractual
liability to the hire company for its costs of repairs and loss of use?
The court
correctly concluded that the claimant had title to the car by virtue of her
possession and could therefore recover for any loss she suffered as a result of
the defendant’s negligent damage of the vehicle (disapproving of statements in
the Court of Appeal to the contrary). Such consequential loss included her
contractual liability to the hire company.
The more
difficult remaining question was whether the consequential loss that she
suffered, by virtue of her contractual liability to the hire company for the
loss of daily use during repairs, was too remote. Lord Leggatt and Burrows
state (at [47](ii)]
“just as loss of use to the claimant is
reasonably foreseeable and not too remote, so is the contractual liability of
the claimant to pay damages for loss of use to the hire company.”
However,
this must be doubtful. If I damage a car, it is reasonably foreseeable by me
that the owner will repair it and that they will be unable to use it while it
is repaired. One would have to be very perspicacious indeed to be able to
reasonably foresee that the car was being hired, and that the terms of the hire
would have a clause requiring the hirer to pay a sum for loss of use on a daily
rate.
But,
although the claimant’s unusual actual loss was not foreseeable, it should
still be recoverable so long as no higher than the ordinary loss that would be
foreseeable, that she did not herself personally incur (under Cory v Thames
Trains), so long as not ruled out for any other reason such as the rules on
mitigation. Such (ordinary) foreseeable loss is the cost of repairs and the
loss of use whilst they’re being carried out.
If
therefore the liability under the contract with the hire company is a genuine
pre-estimate of the loss following from not having a car for that number of
days, it should be recoverable. This is because it would be no more than the
reasonably foreseeable loss in the ordinary case.
But, what
if the clause were unenforceable, perhaps because a penalty or for any other
reason? Could damages for loss of use of the vehicle still be recovered by the
hirer? Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows state (in obiter dicta) that it
could be (at [72]) but here their reasoning is obscure.
If the
clause is unenforceable, the claimant will suffer no consequential loss from
the loss of use during repair. The hire company will, but they are not the
claimant.
The better
answer is that if someone negligently damages a car I have title to, I am
entitled to general damages. If it is destroyed, that is measured by its market
value, but here that is best calculated as being the reasonable costs of
repairs plus a sum reflecting the loss of use during such repairs. Both should
be recoverable regardless of whether the claimant actually suffers any
consequential loss themselves (The Mediana, Burdis v Livsey).
Alternatively,
it may be that in some cases the hire company could recover for loss of use of
the car from the hirer independently of the offending clause, because the hirer
was in breach of another valid obligation, so that consequential loss is still
suffered by her.
Rob
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