From: Varun Srinivasan
<varun@varunsrinivasan.co.in>
Sent: Thursday 15 February 2024 07:44
To: Neil Foster; Robert Stevens; Stéphane
Sérafin; Jason W Neyers; obligations
Subject: Re: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Dear
all,
I
am very intrigued by the connection between the law of penalties and the
damages that would be considered recoverable from the negligent defendant.
In
my view, there is excessive focus on “contractual validity” to determine
remoteness in [48]—[52] of the judgment.
The
principle in [52] appears to suggest that anything payable on a “valid”
contractual clause between the Claimant and Helphire would have been
recoverable from the negligent defendant as reasonably foreseeable damages.
That is probably oversimplified. As Prof. Stevens suggests below — if under the
Makdessi test, a clause could be “valid” but not a genuine pre-estimate
of loss, then the “validity” of the contractual clause is an irrelevant
inquiry, or at least, an incomplete inquiry.
Another
reason comes to mind from Cavendish. What if the clause triggered in the
contract between the Claimant and Helphire was not structured as a secondary
obligation, but a conditional primary obligation/price adjustment? Suppose the
credit-hire agreement was to say that “the period during which the car cannot
be used due to repairs, upon its return, should be construed to be an extension
of the hire period at a special rate of 200% of the original hire rate”
(Curiously, that is precisely how the contract even in this case is analyzed to
justify the rate at [70]).
On
Cavendish’s terms, this would be a conditional primary obligation which
would not even engage the penalty doctrine and enforceable as-is. Surely that
would not mean that any such price is recoverable from the negligent
defendant.
It
seems, despite Cavendish’s best efforts, the “genuine pre-estimate”
standard lives on for some reason or another. There is perhaps more to wonder
on why the “genuine pre-estimate” is good enough to measure third-party
foreseeability but not good enough for the law of penalties.
In
all, a fascinating judgment to discuss for a (very) new ODG member. I hope I
have not overstepped any bounds in joining in.
Best
regards,
Varun
From: Neil
Foster <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>
Date: Thursday, 15 February 2024 at 6:54 AM
To: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>,
Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>,
Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>,
obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Re: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Dear Colleagues;
Thanks for an interesting discussion! I note that similar, though not
the same, issues were discussed by the High Court of Australia in Arsalan
v Rixon; Nguyen v Cassim [2021] HCA 40. That case involved the question
whether damages following a car accident included, not just the cost of a
functional replacement vehicle while repairs were being carried, but also
extended to a replacement vehicle of similar “prestige” to the damaged car. The
answer was yes.
At [3]:
Recovery of damages under these heads
of damage will usually be necessary to restore the plaintiff to the position
they would have been in but for the defendant's actions that caused the
accident. Once the plaintiff acts to mitigate that loss by hiring a substitute
vehicle, the onus of proof will lie upon the defendant to show that the costs
incurred in mitigation were unreasonable.
But the court did not comment on other issues, including the one raised
in Armstead. They said at [4] issues they were not discussing
included:
the extent to which particular hire
expenses, such as credit hire charges, can be said to have been incurred in
mitigation of the losses; and the extent to which the quantum of hire costs is
otherwise shown to be unreasonable.
I think the Armstead decision seems right. However, I note that
the analysis includes reference to a doctrine which is part of UK law but no
longer part of the common law of Australia. Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows say
at [20]:
someone who negligently causes
physical damage to another person’s property is not liable to pay compensation
to a third party claimant who suffers financial loss as a result of the damage.
(See also [27]).
In Australia this (as a general exclusionary rule) has not been the law
since Caltex v The Dredge Willmstad (1976) 136 CLR 529 and in particular
more recently since Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180. But the difference
in approach on this point makes no difference here, since clearly we have a
case of property damage (not “pure” economic loss) of an item possessed by the
claimant, and the debate is about the limits of the damages award that can be
given. I am pretty sure the same result would follow in Australia as in Armstead
here.
I also appreciated the comments at [39]-[40] distinguishing The
Winkfield and noting why the decision in that case did not answer the
question here. In a way the case here was the opposite of The Winkfield.
There, the bailee (the PMG) could recover full damages from the tortfeasor for
conversion of the property he possessed, and those damages were not limited by
the fact that his relationship with the bailors (those who had despatched the
mail) limited his liability to account to them. Here we have a bailee
entitled to recover damages for (in effect) conversion of the chattel she
possessed, and the question is whether the damages she can recover extend
to the contractual obligation she has to pay an extra amount to her bailor.
Subject to legitimate concerns about remoteness (which I agree here can be
analysed as whether the obligation to pay stems from “a genuine and reasonable
attempt to assess the likely losses”), that seems fair.
Regards
Neil
NEIL FOSTER
Associate Professor, Newcastle School of Law and
Justice
College of Human and Social Futures
T: +61 2 49217430
E: neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
Further details: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/profile/neil-foster
My publications: http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster/ , http://ssrn.com/author=504828
Blog: https://lawandreligionaustralia.blog
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From: Robert
Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Date: Thursday, 15 February 2024 at 7:06 am
To: Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>,
"jneyers@uwo.ca" <jneyers@uwo.ca>, "obligations@uwo.ca" <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Sorry
“that the *claimant* was the author of his own misfortune in going down
stairs without a handrail”
As a reviewer noted, I always muddle up my claimants and defendants.
From: Robert Stevens
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 8:02 PM
To: Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>;
Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>;
obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Answer to Stéphane: it is just, so long as the damages don’t exceed the ordinary loss that
you can reasonably foresee, which in turn can be answered by asking whether the
clause was a reasonable pre-estimate of the loss of use an owner will incur
while the vehicle is being repaired.
If the clause were not a reasonable pre-estimate of loss but were still
enforceable under the new Makdessi “legitimate interest” rule, I don’t
think such extra loss should be recoverable. Contra Jason, I don’t think
drivers can reasonably foresee that such contractual loss will be incurred.
FWIIW, I agree with Jason that some of what is said about burden of
proof is doubtful. I don’t think, for example, that in McKew v Holland
the claimant had any prima facie claim for his broken ankle. It
shouldn’t have been for the defendant to have pleaded and proved that although
the tort they had committed was a necessary cause of the broken ankle, that the
defendant was the author of his own misfortune in going down stairs without a
handrail. The claim should fail in relation to the ankle without the defendant
pleading and proving anything.
From: Stéphane Sérafin
<Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 7:46 PM
To: Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>;
Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>;
obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Re: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
I think the special difficulty in this
case is that the contract between, effectively, the bailor and the bailee
altered the extent of the claim that the bailor would normally have against the
bailee. Under those circumstances, is it really just to impose further
liability on a third party, who was not bound by or even had knowledge of the
special arrangements?
From: Jason
W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>
Sent: February 14, 2024 2:43 PM
To: robert.stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>; obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
Attention : courriel externe | external email
Having just skimmed over the decision, isn’t the
answer, that in a world in which rights to use property can be sub-divided
(through leases and bailments and contracts), one of the reasons why it is
negligent to damage property is that this might cause the owner to lose out on
a valuable opportunity to let another use the property or might cause a
bailee/leasee (sub-user) owe damages to the owner?
So I’m not sure why we have to rely on concepts such
as “unforeseeable loses” being “recoverable so long
as no higher than the ordinary loss that would be foreseeable”. But
perhaps I am missing something?
Jason Neyers
Professor of Law
Faculty of Law
Western University
Law Building Rm 26
e. jneyers@uwo.ca
t. 519.661.2111 (x88435)
From: Robert Stevens
<robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 1:42 PM
To: obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Unforeseen Damage in the Supreme Court
An interesting case on remoteness of loss decided by
the UK Supreme Court today: Armstead v RSI [2024] UKSC 6, rightly
overturning a decision of the Court of Appeal. Lords Leggatt and Burrows give
the lead judgment, with which Lord Richards and Lady Simler concur, with a
brief concurrence by Lord Briggs.
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2022-0100.html
A car was hired by the claimant, and negligently
damaged by the defendant. Under the terms of the agreement between the claimant
and the hire company, the claimant is liable for costs of repairs, and to pay a
daily hire rate up to a maximum of 30 days for every day the vehicle is being
repaired. The claimant herself never incurred any costs of repairs nor did she
ever suffer any loss of use during the period of hire. Could the claimant
recover as damages her contractual liability to the hire company for its costs
of repairs and loss of use?
The court correctly concluded that the claimant had
title to the car by virtue of her possession and could therefore recover for
any loss she suffered as a result of the defendant’s negligent damage of the
vehicle (disapproving of statements in the Court of Appeal to the contrary).
Such consequential loss included her contractual liability to the hire company.
The more difficult remaining question was whether the
consequential loss that she suffered, by virtue of her contractual liability to
the hire company for the loss of daily use during repairs, was too remote. Lord
Leggatt and Burrows state (at [47](ii)]
“just as loss
of use to the claimant is reasonably foreseeable and not too remote, so is the
contractual liability of the claimant to pay damages for loss of use to the
hire company.”
However, this must be doubtful. If I damage a car, it
is reasonably foreseeable by me that the owner will repair it and that they
will be unable to use it while it is repaired. One would have to be very
perspicacious indeed to be able to reasonably foresee that the car was being
hired, and that the terms of the hire would have a clause requiring the hirer
to pay a sum for loss of use on a daily rate.
But, although the claimant’s unusual actual loss was
not foreseeable, it should still be recoverable so long as no higher than the
ordinary loss that would be foreseeable, that she did not herself personally
incur (under Cory v Thames Trains), so long as not ruled out for any
other reason such as the rules on mitigation. Such (ordinary) foreseeable loss
is the cost of repairs and the loss of use whilst they’re being carried out.
If therefore the liability under the contract with the
hire company is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss following from not having a
car for that number of days, it should be recoverable. This is because it would
be no more than the reasonably foreseeable loss in the ordinary case.
But, what if the clause were unenforceable, perhaps
because a penalty or for any other reason? Could damages for loss of use of the
vehicle still be recovered by the hirer? Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows state
(in obiter dicta) that it could be (at [72]) but here their reasoning is
obscure.
If the clause is unenforceable, the claimant will
suffer no consequential loss from the loss of use during repair. The hire
company will, but they are not the claimant.
The better answer is that if someone negligently
damages a car I have title to, I am entitled to general damages. If it is
destroyed, that is measured by its market value, but here that is best
calculated as being the reasonable costs of repairs plus a sum reflecting the
loss of use during such repairs. Both should be recoverable regardless of
whether the claimant actually suffers any consequential loss themselves (The
Mediana, Burdis v Livsey).
Alternatively, it may be that in some cases the hire
company could recover for loss of use of the car from the hirer independently
of the offending clause, because the hirer was in breach of another valid
obligation, so that consequential loss is still suffered by her.
Rob
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