From: Jordan English <jordan.english@sjc.ox.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday 14 August 2024 15:31
To: Lionel Smith; obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: RE: HCA on unconscionable conduct and accessory liability
Attachments: English Hickey & Bronitt Federal Proceeds of Crime Law
(Academic Copy).pdf
It would be remiss of me
not to mention that the concept of ‘civil forfeiture’ is not confined to Canada
and is used extensively in Australia to achieve quite draconian aims. One
interesting contribution to the debate is that when forfeiture takes place by
way of a penalty being imposed (equivalent to the value of some benefit
obtained from criminality) the pecuniary penalty is expressly state by the
legislation to have as its object ‘punishment’, but is ‘civil’ in nature. We’ve
written about the ‘civilisation’ of criminal law in this context in the attached.
Jordan
From: Lionel Smith <lionel.smith@law.cam.ac.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2024 3:18 PM
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: Re: HCA on unconscionable conduct and accessory liability
At the risk of piling on..I add to Paul’s note that in
Canada we (and the JCPC) have had to address this issue since Confederation in
1867, because the Constitution Act 1867, s 91(27), assigns “the criminal law”
exclusively to the federal Parliament. Meanwhile the provinces regulate
enormous numbers of things, including the roads. My recollection (from first
year law school) is that the distinction for the purposes of s 91(27) is
between ‘true criminal law’ (sounds like a TV genre?) and ‘regulatory offences’.
Malum in se and malum prohibitum are not far from centre stage here (but don’t
ask me to summarize the complex case law). Regulatory offences, however, can be
very serious and can carry jail terms. Hence s 11 of our 1982 Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, providing the procedural guarantees to which Paul
referred, is captioned ‘Proceedings in criminal and penal matters’ and
applies to ‘any person charged with an offence’ and this includes ‘regulatory
offences’.
The most disgraceful example in Canada of the
game-playing that Rob referred to is the booming business of ‘civil forfeiture’
which has been filling provincial coffers for some years. Assets that are
the proceeds of crime, or that have been used (or in one case might be used in
the future) in the commission of a criminal offence, can be forfeited to the
provincial Crown, with being proof on a balance of probabilities. Since the
proceeding is an in rem one, a civil proceeding ‘against’ the asset, it
is not a criminal proceeding and s 11 of the Charter is not engaged. I
personally can’t believe that the Supreme Court of Canada fell for that
(although the US Supreme Court did also, some years ago). Thus (to take an
example adapted from a real case) you could lose your house if your son, who
lives there as your tenant, deals or uses drugs in the house; and this, without
anyone being charged with or convicted of an offence (criminal or regulatory).
Lionel
From: Paul
Daly <paul.daly@uottawa.ca>
Date: Wednesday, August 14, 2024 at 14:24
To: Norman Siebrasse <norman.siebrasse@gmail.com>,
Jeannie Paterson <jeanniep@unimelb.edu.au>
Cc: ODG <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: HCA on unconscionable conduct and accessory liability
As noted by
others, the ECHR jurisprudence on art. 6 addresses the distinction between
civil and criminal penalties.
For anyone
interested in this important issue, the Supreme Court of Canada has also
weighed in on the question of whether some civil penalties (known here as
administrative monetary penalties) are disguised criminal offences that attract
Charter protections. For a summary of the most recent decision, from
2015, see my note here.
From: Norman Siebrasse <norman.siebrasse@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2024 7:56 AM
To: Jeannie Paterson <jeanniep@unimelb.edu.au>
Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: Re: HCA on unconscionable conduct and accessory liability
Attention : courriel externe | external email
As
another example, the Canadian
Competition Act provides for an "administrative monetary penalty"
of up to $10m for an abuse of dominant position (s74.1.(1)(c)), or for
prematurely closing a notifiable transaction (123.1(3)). The Act assures us it
is not criminal in nature: 79(3.3) "The purpose of an order made against a
person under subsection (3.1) is to promote practices by that person that are
in conformity with the purposes of this section and not to punish that
person."
.
On Wed, Aug
14, 2024 at 8:48 AM Jeannie Paterson <jeanniep@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
Eg the Data Protection Act 2018.
Jeannie Marie Paterson | The University of Melbourne
Professor of Law (Consumer Protection and Emerging Technology)
Fairness, Transparency and Coherence (FTC) in Consumer and Credit Protection Project | Melbourne Law School
Director of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Ethics | Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
The University of Melbourne
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/centres/caide
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/about/staff/jeannie-paterson
--
Norman Siebrasse
Professor of Law
University of New Brunswick
Sufficient
Description.com