B e f o r e :

and

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Michael Lyndon-Stanford, QC and Oliver Michell (instructed by Messrs Cartier & Co.for Sheikh Khaled)

John Davies (instructed by Messrs Georgiou Nicholas for Mr. Folchi)

Andrew Popplewell, QC and Paul Wright (instructed by Messrs Baker & M^c Kenzie for Grupo Torras SA)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

13. Croesus involved the misappropriation of US$27.4m in May 1988. The money ended up in a Swiss bank account belonging to Mr. de la Rosa and his wife. Its misappropriation was concealed behind a facade of paper transactions culminating the following year in a loan by THL to Croesus, a shell company. This loan was written off in GT’s 1990 accounts. The Judge found that Mr. de la Rosa had benefited from this misappropriation which had been made with the knowledge and consent of Sheikh Fahad and Mr. Jaffar. A claim against Mr. Folchi in respect of Croesus was not pursued at trial.
14. Oakthorn 1 involved the misappropriation of US$55m in July 1989. The money was paid by THL under a loan agreement to Oakthorn, a Jersey company effectively controlled by Mr. Folchi, ostensibly to enable Oakthorn to acquire an English shelf company, Wardbase, which was to earn commission on the sale of GT’s investments out of which the loan was to be repaid. Mr. Folchi was intimately involved in setting up this structure. There was, as the Judge held, "nothing" in it "except a desire to find some cloak to ‘repay’ a ‘loan’ from GT to Oakthorn which it was never contemplated could or would be repaid". Upon receipt of the money into Oakthorn’s account US$50m was paid away to three Swiss banks on the instructions of Mr Folchi’s assistant, Mrs. Parker. US$45m was divided equally between accounts belonging to Sheikh Fahad at Lombard Odier ("Attention Thierry Lombard") and Mr Jaffar, although Mr Folchi was unaware at the time that they were the recipients. US$5m was paid to Bankers Trust, Geneva (Mr. Byrde), where, on the instructions of Mr. Folchi it was paid into account "Stuart" which Mr. Folchi knew had recently been opened by Mr de la Rosa. At the same time Mr. Folchi opened account "Falcon" for himself. In due course US$0·775m was paid into this account from the balance of the money paid to Oakthorn.
15. Oakthorn 2 involved the misappropriation of US$50m in June 1990 in much the same way as Oakthorn 1. The ‘loan’ by THL to Oakthorn was paid away on Mrs. Parker’s instructions, counter-signed by Mr. Folchi. US$32.5m went to bank accounts in the names of Sheikh Fahad (in London) and Mr Jaffar (at Rud Blass Bank, Zurich). At Mr. de la Rosa’s request Mr. Folchi arranged for US$15·49m to be paid indirectly (via a British Virgin Islands company, Allsports) into account Stuart. US$1.39m was then paid from account Stuart to account Falcon.
16. Pincinco involved the misappropriation of US$300m in October 1990. The money misappropriated was part of a loan of US$400m (Ptas. 40 billion) made by the KIO through Koolmees to GT because their credit standing in Spain had fallen as a result of the occupation of Kuwait. This loan followed a loan of US$800m (Ptas. 80 billion) made several weeks earlier. It was accepted that this earlier loan and the balance of the US$400m loan were properly used for GT’s purposes. On the 2nd October 1990 Mr Folchi and others went to Geneva where they opened an account for THL (of which Mr. Folchi had been appointed a director the previous day) with Bankers Trust. The US$300m was deposited in this account and pledged as security for a loan of the same amount which the bank agreed to make to Pincinco, a Jersey company effectively controlled by Mr Folchi who had earlier advised on setting up this structure. By letter of 2nd October counter signed by Mr Folchi the bank were instructed that upon receipt of the loan into Pincinco’s account various payments should be made including US$75m to Lombard Odier - "Attention Thierry Lombard" (Sheikh Fahad), US$4m to Rud Blass Bank, Zurich (Mr. Jaffar), US$100m to account Stuart, US$80m (as it transpired) to a Spaniard who claimed that Mr de la Rosa owed him this money and US$15m to a numbered account with UBS Geneva "REF. PAD".
17. PAD was Mr Paul Dawson, Sheikh Khaled’s friend and financial adviser in Switzerland. The UBS account was that of Mr Oberson, a Swiss tax lawyer. Mr Dawson and Mr Oberson had advised Sheikh Khaled earlier in the year about ways in which his and his family’s money could be invested through them in Switzerland in a tax efficient and confidential way. Mr Dawson had passed Mr Oberson’s account number to Sheikh Khaled by fax on the 17th September 1990. In fact the money was not paid from Pincinco to Mr Oberson’s account in accordance with the instructions contained in the letter but US$2m was paid on October 5th and the balance by 13 twice weekly instalments of US$1m each. There is no record of how the instructions given in the letter came to be varied to reflect the way in which the money was actually paid. In addition to the US$15m a further US$5m was paid in two instalments into Mr. Oberson’s account for Sheikh Khaled from account Stuart in early 1991. The monies received for Sheikh Khaled were paid on his instructions to a Jersey trust which managed some of his family’s assets (US$9m) because he and his family needed this money to meet expenditure, to two Panamanian companies which had been formed as part of the off-shore structure set up by Mr. Dawson and Mr. Oberson (about US$4.5m each) and to Mr. Dawson as a fee (US$2m).
18. In July 1991 when THL’s auditors asked for confirmation of the deposit of US$300m from Bankers Trust they were not told of the loan to Pincinco. Mr. Folchi signed THL’s accounts which showed the deposit as cash at bank or in hand. At the same time an elaborate scheme was being devised by Mr. Coll, an accountant with English and Spanish qualifications, to deal with the outstanding loan. The deposit and the loan to Pincinco were replaced by loans from THL to Coggia, a shelf company. Repayment of these loans was notionally effected by a transaction in which GT issued shares at par to another shelf company which were passed to Coggia and then reacquired by GT from Coggia at seventeen times par. The sums in which the Judge gave judgment against Sheikh Khaled and Mr. Folchi in respect of Pincinco reflect GT’s total losses at the conclusion of these transactions. Mr. Folchi received a total of US$5.567m from Pincinco money and was paid over US$4m in fees for the transaction..
19. Wardbase involved the misappropriation of US$20m in May 1992. A payment of this amount was made to Wardbase ostensibly as a fee for managing an engineering project in Belgium in which GT had an interest. In fact Wardbase was not capable of and did not provide any such services. The Judge found that a forged agreement purporting to be made in September 1989 had been created in early 1992 to justify Wardbase’s entitlement to the fee. A copy of this agreement was found on Mr. Folchi’s files. By letter of 30th March 1992 Mrs. Parker, signing on behalf of Wardbase, demanded payment of the fee under this agreement and followed this up with a Wardbase invoice. In May another firm of Spanish lawyers demanded payment on behalf of Wardbase and the money was paid to Wardbase by THL the day before Mr. de la Rosa resigned from GT. Upon receipt of the money about US$19m was paid away from Wardbase in a way designed to conceal its destination on Mrs. Parker’s instructions. Those instructions had come from Mr. Folchi who in turn had received them from Mr. de la Rosa. The Judge found that Mr. de la Rosa had conspired with others (who were not defendants) to defraud GT in this transaction and that Mr. Folchi or his firm would at some point have taken fees out of the remaining US$1m if it had not been frozen by the Claimants.
20. During late 1991 and early 1992 the KIA became increasingly concerned about the extent of the KIO’s exposure to GT and GT’s parlous financial state. Lawyers and accountants were instructed to investigate.
21. In October 1992 the Ruler of Kuwait sent his finance minister to London to put to Sheikh Fahad and Mr. de la Rosa the allegation that they had embezzled the KIO’s money. A meeting was arranged at Mr. Jaffar’s house. At the meeting, which was attended by Sheikh Fahad, Sheikh Khaled. and Mr. Folchi in place of Mr. de la Rosa, the allegation was denied. However, Mr. Folchi took the opportunity of asking Sheikh Fahad to contribute to the legal costs of his involvement in the investigation. Shortly after the meeting Sheikh Fahad and Mr. Jaffar each paid Mr Folchi US$2m. In December 1992 Mr. Folchi received another US$2m paid by Sheikh Khaled through off-shore entities. In January 1993 by the same means Sheikh Khaled paid Mr. de la Rosa US$2m in the form of a loan.
22. In November 1992 Mr. Folchi attended meetings with representatives of the Attorney General of Kuwait following which he submitted a memorandum to the Attorney General giving his understanding of the transactions in question. Omissions from the memorandum and inconsistencies between what it said and his evidence at trial featured prominently in the case against him.
23. The proceedings were started in April 1993. At this stage the claimants were unaware that Sheikh Khaled had received any money from Pincinco and he was not made a defendant. In late 1994 the claimants obtained Pincinco’s bank statements which showed that US$2m (the last two of the thirteen instalments) had been paid to Mr. Oberson’s account. Mr. Oberson was joined as a defendant to the proceedings and the claimants then discovered from documents supplied by him that Sheikh Khaled was the intended recipient of the US$2m and a further US$18m. This resulted in Sheikh Khaled being joined as a defendant in March 1995.
24. In the meantime however, in December 1994 Mr. Dawson told Sheikh Khaled that the claimants had been asking Mr. Oberson about the US$2m. Sheikh Khaled paid US$2m to Mr. Oberson to enable him to repay it to the claimants but Mr. Oberson’s solicitors advised him not to do so. In addition to the US$2m Sheikh Khaled paid Mr. Oberson US$500,000 for the work he had done and to cover his legal fees in London.

 

Sheikh Khaled.

Case at Trial.

25. Sheikh Khaled’s defence depended upon the credibility of his explanation for his receipt of the US$20m. He said that after his promotion at the end of 1989 Mr. de la Rosa began to pay more attention to him. He used to pop into his office for a five or ten minute chat. In the course of these conversations Mr. de la Rosa suggested various investments in Spain. Sheikh Khaled was interested because Mr. de la Rosa had the reputation for being a very successful entrepreneur with the "Midas touch". He asked Sheikh Fahad and Bruce Dawson (Paul’s father) whether it was all right to deal with Mr. de la Rosa and they assured him of his integrity. Sheikh Khaled made two investments through Paul Dawson on this advice.
26. In the course of these conversations Mr. de la Rosa mentioned another investment opportunity to Sheikh Khaled. He said he had put together a small consortium to invest in a management buy out of an arms and explosives business in Spain. The company was controlled by relatives of the founder who were unaware of its true value and wanted to sell out. The idea was that Mr. de la Rosa’s consortium would put up US$30-40m and borrow further money to enable the buy out to take place. The company would then be sold on at a very considerable profit. He had in mind a multi-national company with whose operations it would fit well. There were two other entities interested in the business: one a consortium put together by a Syrian living in Madrid and the other an Israeli group. Confidentiality was therefore paramount. Sheikh Khaled was interested and after discussing the investment in general terms with his family in June or July 1990 he told Mr. de la Rosa that he would join the consortium and put up US$2-3m. In late August Mr. de la Rosa told him that things were proceeding well with the buy out and that he would let him know if and when his money was needed. A week or so later Mr. de la Rosa said that the buy out had been concluded and had been enormously successful. He had been able to sell the company straight on so it was not necessary for Sheikh Khaled to come up with any money. However, he was entitled to his share of the profit which was US$20m. Two or three weeks later Mr. de la Rosa told him that he would be paid in instalments of US$1m because the profit had been invested in such a way that it was impossible to obtain it in one lump sum. In mid September Mr. de la Rosa asked him to provide details of the account into which the money should be paid and he supplied the details of Mr. Oberson’s account given to him by Mr. Dawson. Sheikh Khaled said that although he was surprised he did not question the profit which he had made since he was aware that substantial profits were possible from management buy outs at that time.
27. When Kuwait was occupied by Iraq at the beginning of August 1990 Sheikh Fahad and Sheikh Khaled were given plenipotentiary powers over all Kuwait’s assets. The weeks which followed were hectic. He was involved in raising funds, releasing funds which had been frozen in a number of European countries and directing them to where they were needed for the war effort. He accepted that he was "probably" aware of the Ptas 120b advance to GT in the summer and autumn of 1990 and that he signed authorisations for some of the transactions which led to the advance of Ptas 80b. However, he knew nothing of Pincinco or that his US$20m had come from the monies advanced to GT. In the course of his evidence he volunteered that in April 1993 when questions were being asked about the US$300m he asked Mr. de la Rosa whether he was involved in this deal. Mr. de la Rosa’s dismissal of the idea gave him a sense of confidence because "he had a belief that he was not into such deals".
28. Sheikh Khaled explained that the payments of US$2m to Mr. Folchi and Mr. de la Rosa were loans which he had made reluctantly after he had been pestered by Mr. de la Rosa and at the request of Sheikh Fahad who said "They are our friends" and personally guaranteed repayment of the loans. When in December 1994 Mr. Dawson told him that it was being alleged that the US$2m paid into Mr. Oberson’s account was the KIO’s money, he was horrified and panic stricken. He paid the US$2.5m on Mr. Dawson’s advice and assurance that if he did he would not be involved in the litigation, which he dreaded and was desperate to avoid. Mr. Dawson also told him that Mr. Oberson agreed with this advice.
29. After he had been joined in the proceedings Sheikh Khaled was required to explain his receipt of the US$20m. His first Affidavit said :

I received such monies in the genuine belief that it represented underwriting fees on an investment in a company, nothing to do with the plaintiffs.

He promised to explain further in a subsequent Affidavit which was sworn on 24 April 1995. It said:

Whilst I personally would like to explain the matter in detail the whole of the information required is not yet available to me and I am advised by my solicitors (Kingsley Napley) that it would be unwise at present to go on oath about the matter.

However, it went on to say :

The term ‘underwriting fees’ is how I viewed it in my mind but it might be that it was more properly a return on a capital investment or a potential capital investment.

30. It is clear that before the trial Sheikh Khaled’s solicitors had made enquiries in Spain with a view to obtaining some confirmation of the existence of a deal of the kind Sheikh Khaled said Mr. de la Rosa had described. These enquiries were unsuccessful because, it is said, funds to continue with them ran out.
31. Sheikh Khaled gave evidence that at the time when he is alleged to have joined the conspiracy all his efforts were devoted to saving Kuwait. Others working in the KIO gave evidence about their surprise at any suggestion that he should at the same time have diverted any funds to himself and of their disbelief that someone of his character should do so. Mr. Black and Mr. Betts went to work for Sheikh Khaled after he left the KIO. Mr. Betts and others described him as extremely trusting. Mr. Betts believed that Sheikh Khaled trusted Mr. de la Rosa and that he could have been persuaded to "enter a deal similar to that described in Sheikh Khaled’s witness statement". Other impressive character witnesses attested to Sheikh Khaled’s integrity.

 

Judge’s Findings.

32. The Judge set himself the task of assessing the credibility of Sheikh Khaled’s evidence by reference to a passage in the judgment of Robert Goff LJ in The Ocean Frost [1985] 1 LLR 1, 57. This required him to test the evidence given in the witness box against the objective facts, the overall probabilities and the motives of those involved. He described the character evidence as impressive and said :

it accentuated the burden on the plaintiffs which arises from the seriousness of the charges of dishonest conspiracy and dishonest breach of duty which they make against Sheikh Khaled.

He recorded his general impression of Sheikh Khaled’s abilities as follows:

From what I have seen and heard of Sheikh Khaled I am unable to view him as unsophisticated or unversed in the ways of business or finance ........ The general picture I have formed is not that of a naif. Nor did he come across as such in the witness box. There were occasions when his mastery of English and so of the questioning did not appear perfect. Apart from that, he appeared not only to be a person of intelligence, but to have a good grasp of affairs.

33. The Judge then considered the probability of Sheikh Khaled’s account. He said:

Sheikh Khaled’s account of the origin of the US$20m represents, even on its face, a very strange story. This goes to two aspects - whether there was any such buy out in or about August 1990, and whether, assuming there was not, Mr. de la Rosa gulled Sheikh Khaled into believing that there was and paid him US$20m out of Pincinco on that basis. As to the first, Mr. de la Rosa’s Midas touch must clearly have excelled itself in the interests of himself and his favoured partners (and have done so at a time when GT was itself facing major financial pre-occupations), if so spectacular a transaction was really achieved. The overall profit, for the members of the syndicate from whom Mr. de la Rosa said that he was raising US$30-40m, must have been some US$200-400m and this must have been made not just in the face of competition from two other syndicates but with the shareholders all the while remaining ignorant of the true value of their company and with the multi-national end purchaser allowing itself, whether through ignorance or deliberately, to pay several hundred millions more than the shareholders were prepared to take. Further, to achieve the profits which he had originally anticipated, Mr. de la Rosa did not need either to manage the company for six months or to dispose of any peripheral business or even to call for any of the monies which it was the sole purpose of the syndicate to provide. The lack of any detailed information about the transaction or any single document referring to it, even after its overwhelming success, is striking. The explanation for the remission of the profit (viz. that Mr. de la Rosa had, for some unexplained reason and without consultation, placed it on deposit for fixed periods maturing in weekly or so instalments over a three month period) is hard to understand. Sheikh Khaled’s evidence did not dispel the strangeness of the account in any of these respects.

There is nothing making it absolutely impossible that such a transaction should occur. But there is neither evidence nor, on the material before me any likelihood that there was ever any actual transaction like that about which Sheikh Khaled says Mr. de la Rosa informed him in summer 1990 ........ the second aspect ........ is whether, although there was in fact no such transaction, Mr. de la Rosa led Sheikh Khaled to believe that there was and paid him US$20m out of Pincinco on the basis that there was. As a matter of general probability, and making all due allowance for the fact that Mr. de la Rosa had at the time an excellent reputation but was, underneath, dishonest as well as the fact that he was utilising someone else’s money, it is difficult to conceive that even Mr. de la Rosa would have acted in this way. Why would Mr. de la Rosa ( or any of his co-conspirators) decide to invent so remarkable a transaction, about which he or they would have to reckon that even the most trusting person might well wish to have further details, in order to make a gift to Sheikh Khaled of US$20m from the ill-gotten proceeds of their fraud? Sheikh Khaled acknowledged that this was the burning question.

The most obvious answer, and the actual answer according to the plaintiffs, is that the US$20m was a sweetener to Sheikh Khaled to ensure co-operation or silence in relation to the Pincinco fraud involving US$300m. I accept that it is improbable that Sheikh Khaled was a prime mover of the Pincinco fraud and that he appears to have had effectively no day to day involvement with Spain despite his directorship of GT. But it cannot be ignored that he was a close relative who Sheikh Fahad may well have been pleased to involve and to benefit. Further, Sheikh Khaled’s position within the KIO and his responsibilities, especially during the invasion, his awareness of the huge financial support (Ptas.120b) made available to GT through Koolmees in the summer and autumn 1990, and his signature of the relevant authorisation and instructions at Mr. Bett’s request, may well have meant that other conspirators would have felt that they either needed or should ensure his co-operation or agreement. Even during the crisis following the Iraqi invasion, I doubt whether Sheikh Khaled really regarded the financial support being afforded to GT with as little interest as his evidence tended to suggest, and the provision of such support was, as later events showed, capable of giving rise to controversy and objections within the KIO or KIA.

Mr. McGhee for Sheikh Khaled invited me to consider the possibility that Sheikh Khaled may have been given US$20m out of Pincinco, ...... to secure a ‘hold’ over Sheikh Khaled (who could later himself be shown to have received money from a dubious source) in case anyone at any time (should) seem about to investigate or discover the Pincinco fraud........

As to the suggested aim of acquiring a ‘hold’ over Sheikh Khaled in case a risk appeared that fraud on GT or THL might be discovered, that appears to postulate that Mr. de la Rosa would have been prepared to invest US$20m in Sheikh Khaled on the speculation that, although Sheikh Khaled was not involved in the Pincinco transaction and had received the US$20m innocently, he would have been prepared to suppress any investigation of the Pincinco transaction, and presumably to retain the US$20m once its origin was pointed out to him, for fear of being (wrongly) implicated in the Pincinco transaction. It is true that Sheikh Khaled cannot be expected to produce anything positive to support any such plot, assuming that there was one, and that the onus of proof of his dishonesty remains on the plaintiffs. But I have to say that the idea of a plot of this extreme nature appears to me far-fetched. The simpler explanation, that Sheikh Khaled was himself knowingly involved, is in my view more probable.

34. The Judge then went on to consider Sheikh Khaled’s subsequent conduct which he said "lent significant support to the claimants’ case that he was dishonestly involved". He described the payment of US$4m to Mr. Folchi and Mr. de la Rosa as "a substantial act of generosity" but made no specific findings adverse to Sheikh Khaled in relation to this. He described Sheikh Khaled’s evidence about his conversation with Mr. de la Rosa in April 1993 as "curious" because Sheikh Khaled must have known whether or not he was involved in such deals. The Judge found that the offer of payment to Mr. Oberson was made in the hope of obtaining the withdrawal of the claim against Mr. Oberson and preventing the claimants discovering about his own receipt of US$20m. Of Sheikh Khaled’s reasons for making the payment to Mr. Oberson he said:

I accept that Sheikh Khaled may well be generally nervous about privacy and about involvement in litigation. All the same, I find this a most unlikely explanation for the voluntary payment of US$2.5m, if Sheikh Khaled is being truthful about the circumstances in which he originally received the US$20m.

35. Having considered Sheikh Khaled’s evidence, which he described as "marked by vagueness and some inconsistency", and his original explanation for the receipt of the money which "one could have expected to be more forthcoming", and was "difficult to reconcile" with his present account, the Judge said :

Finally, so far as concerns the impression which Sheikh Khaled made in the witness box, this is not a case where it can be said that Sheikh Khaled collapsed, or was lost for answers on critical points, or was clearly demonstrated under cross-examination to be a liar. On the other hand, I did not regard either the way he gave his evidence or its content as lending a real patina of conviction, innocence or truthfulness to an inherently improbable account, or to subsequent conduct which fits more consistently with the plaintiffs’ case than Sheikh Khaled’s. It is however, of course, for the plaintiffs to prove the serious charge which they make.

36. The Judge concluded by saying :

Viewing the whole range of the material before me and the overall probabilities in the manner mentioned by Robert Goff LJ in The Ocean Frost, I reject without real hesitation Sheikh Khaled’s account of the basis upon which he received US$20m out of the Pincinco transaction. I accept that he is unlikely to have been a prime initiator and that the actual assistance which he lent in signing authorisations and instructions was limited. But there were reasons why those who were prime movers would have been quite likely to wish to involve Sheikh Khaled, not simply in order to ensure that such authorisations and instructions went unquestioned, but also to secure their positions generally and, in the case of Sheikh Fahad, very possibly also to benefit Sheikh Khaled as a junior family member. However that may be, in my judgment, Sheikh Khaled received the US$20m not on the basis he has described, but as the price of his agreement to and, so far as required, involvement in and silence about the transaction.

 

The Appeal.

37. Sheikh Khaled contends that the Judge was wrong to find that he was party to the dishonest conspiracy in respect of Pincinco. It is common ground that the Judge’s finding of dishonest assistance stands or falls with the finding of conspiracy. In a Respondent’s Notice the claimants contended that if Sheikh Khaled was not dishonest he was nevertheless liable on the basis of knowing receipt, but this was not pursued. They have however pursued a claim that as a director of GT Sheikh Khaled was liable for the fraud of his co-directors under Spanish company law.
38. Mr. Lyndon-Stanford QC, who now appears for Sheikh Khaled, made a number of criticisms of the way the Judge applied the burden and standard of proof in reaching his conclusions about Sheikh Khaled. He also complained that in some respects the Judge had given insufficient reasons for his decision. It is convenient to deal with these points first and then to remind ourselves of the proper approach of the Court of Appeal in cases such as this.
39. The Judge directed himself on the burden and standard of proof in accordance with the speech of Lord Nicholls in Re H [Minors] [1996] AC 563, 586-7. In rejecting the argument for a standard higher than the balance of probability in civil cases where serious allegations were made Lord Nicholls said :

When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and hence the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence ........ The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established

Mr. Lyndon-Stanford accepts that this is the law but says that in making the critical findings against Sheikh Khaled the Judge did not make it clear that he was applying it. We do not agree. Twice in the passages which we have cited the Judge referred to the burden being upon the claimants to prove the serious charges which they made. He cannot have overlooked what he had said earlier in his judgment about the standard of proof. In any event he said that even if the standard required was the criminal standard it would not affect the findings which he made.

40. Mr. Lyndon-Stanford’s criticism of the sufficiency of the Judge’s reasons very much overlaps with his criticism of the reasons themselves. We do not think there is any basis for saying that the Judge should have given further or fuller reasons. It is precisely because he did give full reasons for his conclusions that Sheikh Khaled has been able to attack them.
41. This court’s approach to appeals on questions of fact is well known. The burden of showing that the trial judge was wrong lies on the appellant. In cases where the judge has had to decide questions of credibility Lord Reid in Benmax -v- Austin Motor Co. Ltd. [1955] AC 370, 375-6 cited with approval the following passage from an earlier case:

I. Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge’s conclusion;

II. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence;

III. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court. It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question.

42. Mr. Lyndon-Stanford contends that in a number of respects the Judge got the facts wrong. Generally we reject this criticism but there is one point of some importance and that relates to the transfer of the Ptas 40b which went to fund Pincinco. The Judge appears to have thought that Sheikh Khaled "gave the relevant authorisation" for this transfer by the KIO through Koolmees to GT. In the concluding part of his judgment (quoted at paragraph 36) he refers to the actual assistance which Sheikh Khaled lent to the conspiracy "in signing authorisations and instructions". In fact there was no evidence that Sheikh Khaled had signed any authorisation or instruction in respect of the Ptas 40b. There is a KIO document dated October 2nd 1990 confirming Mr. Folchi’s instruction to Koolmees’ bankers in Madrid which has Sheikh Khaled’s name typed on it. But this document was not put to Sheikh Khaled at the trial and is not signed by him. Other authorisations in the same form which we have seen have been signed by him. None of the other documents instructing the payment of the money down to THL in Geneva was signed by Sheikh Khaled.
43. Mr. Popplewell, QC, Counsel for the Respondents, argued that we should conclude that Sheikh Khaled did authorise and/or was aware of the transfer of Ptas 40b. Only he or Sheikh Fahad could have authorised the transfer and there was no evidence that Sheikh Fahad did.
44. As we have already said, Sheikh Khaled accepted that he was generally aware of the transfer of Ptas 120b to GT, but we do not think that there is any basis for concluding that he specifically signed authorisations or gave instructions in respect of the Ptas 40b. This is significant because if he was involved one would expect his fellow conspirators to require him to sign the authorisation; otherwise he would have done nothing to facilitate the fraud. As it was the only overt act involving Sheikh Khaled in the conspiracy is his receipt of US$20m to which we now turn.
45. At the heart of the Judge’s reasoning in the passages quoted in paragraph 33 is his rejection of any credible reason why Sheikh Khaled should have been paid US$20m unless he was involved in the conspiracy. Thus, having concluded that there was never in fact any transaction of the kind which Sheikh Khaled says Mr. de la Rosa told him about, the Judge found it "difficult to conceive" why Mr. de la Rosa should have invented such a transaction in order to make him a gift of US$20m from the proceeds of the fraud. The "most obvious answer" was that the money was a sweetener to ensure his co-operation or silence. The suggestion that the money was paid to secure a hold over Sheikh Khaled was a plot of "an extreme nature" which the Judge thought was "far fetched". The simpler explanation that Sheikh Khaled was himself "knowingly involved" was considerably more probable.
46. Mr. Lyndon-Stanford submits that it was more probable that the money was paid to secure a hold over Sheikh Khaled than as his share of the fraud as a fellow conspirator. Attempting to involve Sheikh Khaled in the conspiracy ran the risk that he would refuse and start asking questions which would reveal the earlier frauds in which he had played no part whatsoever. The Judge did not consider this or properly consider whether it was probable that the conspirators would want Sheikh Khaled to join them at this stage. Having dismissed the suggestion that the money had been paid to get a hold over Sheikh Khaled, the Judge concluded in effect that he must have been a conspirator without considering the probability that he was. Having regard to the amounts paid to Sheikh Fahad and Mr. de la Rosa from the proceeds of this massive fraud, payment to Sheikh Khaled of only US$20m by instalments was inconsistent with his involvement in the conspiracy.
47. Mr. Popplewell submits that the Judge was right to dismiss the suggestion that the money was paid to get a hold over Sheikh Khaled. The suggestion was not put forward by Sheikh Khaled but by his lawyers. It presupposes that Sheikh Khaled was an honest man. Why should the conspirators assume that once he discovered where the money he had received came from he would keep quiet? An honest man could be expected to expose the fraud whenever he discovered it. If Mr. de la Rosa’s motive had been to get a hold over Sheikh Khaled why did he say that Sheikh Khaled was not involved when he was asked about it in April 1993? If there was a plan to set Sheikh Khaled up it must have been made before Pincinco was conceived, since the opportunity to commit a fraud on that scale only arose after the occupation of Kuwait. What reason did the conspirators have for doing this? US$20m was too great a price to pay for getting a hold over Sheikh Khaled given the risk that it might not work. The point about the improbability of Sheikh Khaled being asked to join the conspiracy is unrealistic. People can be sounded out and drawn into a conspiracy by degrees without revealing the true purpose of the approach. These conspirators were clever men.
48. So the critical question we have to answer is was the Judge right to dismiss as he did the suggestion that the money had been paid to get a hold over Sheikh Khaled? Whilst the answer to this question obviously played a very important part in the Judge’s assessment of Sheikh Khaled’s credibility, it does not depend upon credibility as such but upon evaluation of inherent probability. This is a task which this court can and should perform without much inhibition. Moreover, in this case the inherent probabilities depend to a considerable extent on the understanding and motives of Mr. de la Rosa in particular and Sheikh Fahad, neither of whom the Judge saw, although of course he was in a better position to form a view of their characters than we are.
49. By mid 1990 Mr. Jaffar had left the KIO and Sheikh Khaled had moved into his office in the hope that he would become the general manager. To Sheikh Fahad and Mr. de la Rosa, who had been involved in previous frauds, the risk of Sheikh Khaled, with a reputation for integrity, preventing or discovering future or even past frauds must have been apparent. One obvious way of avoiding this was to get him to join them. But this was risky and the possibility of compromising him could well have been considered as a feasible alternative. Mr. de la Rosa was well qualified to set Sheikh Khaled up. The Judge broadly accepted Mr. Folchi’s description of him as being charismatic and able to sell everything to everybody, obsessed with obtaining information without giving it but (as the Judge held) with a capacity for obfuscation and deception even of close friends and colleagues. Mr. de la Rosa would obviously have been capable of selling an apparently implausible story to Sheikh Khaled as to why he was to receive US$20m. The more implausible the story the more difficult it would be for Sheikh Khaled later to explain his receipt of such a large sum of money. If and when he discovered where it had come from or any other frauds the conspirators would be in a position to point out to him that he had already been compromised.
50. When he was asked in cross-examination what reason Mr. de la Rosa could have had for paying him US$20m from a non-existent transaction or the proceeds of his fraud Sheikh Khaled replied "That is the burning question" and "I do not know why he has put me in this position". These answers are consistent with innocence and certainly do not preclude the suggestion that he was set up which was made on his behalf. US$20m was a large sum to pay but Sheikh Khaled and his family were wealthy (he admitted that the money increased their liquid overseas assets by about 50%) and the sum to be paid had to be large enough to compromise him. It can be argued with equal force that US$20m is inconsistent with participation in the conspiracy because it was too little.
51. We think the Judge was wrong to conclude that the suggestion that the money was paid to Sheikh Khaled to gain a hold over him was far-fetched. It was a possible or probable explanation which had to be considered and evaluated against the other possible or probable explanation that the money was his reward for participating in the fraud. The fact that the Judge did not do this means that his reasoning is flawed. This point was, as we have said, at the heart of his reasons for rejecting Sheikh Khaled’s evidence. We are not therefore satisfied that if the Judge had approached the matter in the way we have indicated, he would inevitably have reached the same conclusion. But it does not follow that the Judge’s decision was wrong. The matter is at large and it is for us to decide whether the Judge’s conclusion that Sheikh Khaled was dishonest can stand.
52. It is obvious that no transaction of the kind Sheikh Khaled said Mr. de la Rosa told him about ever took place. With the benefit of hindsight Sheikh Khaled’s account of what he was told is, as the Judge said, a very strange story. He did not ask a number of obvious questions about the proposed investment and the others involved and his commitment to it was not precisely defined. The supposed profit came immediately without the need to put up any money and was enormous. But the question is not whether it was a strange story, but whether it was an invented story. If it was, one might have expected Sheikh Khaled to have come up with something better. It was not suggested to Sheikh Khaled that he and Mr. de la Rosa had concocted this story as a cover to explain receipt of the money if it was discovered. The claimants’ case was that it was simply untrue and there was absolutely no evidence to support it. With this in mind, on the hearing of this appeal we admitted for what it was worth a report from Spanish enquiry agents who were instructed on behalf of Sheikh Khaled after judgment. Their report suggests that at the relevant time in 1990 unsuccessful attempts were made by a Syrian arms dealer and an Israeli group to acquire a successful Spanish company manufacturing arms and explosives and that in some way Mr. de la Rosa was also involved. The information contained in the report is qualified and largely hearsay although it confirms that in Spain there is an "unwritten rule of silence" and "the greatest privacy" relating to information about sales and purchases in the arms and explosives business. However, despite these qualifications, this report does lend some credence to Sheikh Khaled’s story. It at least makes it likely that Sheikh Khaled was given some information about a transaction involving a Spanish arms and explosives company and that the likely source of this information was Mr. de la Rosa. Sheikh Khaled does not speak Spanish and had no other real involvement with Spain.
53. As we have already said, if the intention was to compromise Sheikh Khaled the more implausible the story he accepted the more effective the hold would be over him. If Sheikh Khaled had asked more questions Mr. de la Rosa was well able to come up with plausible answers supported, if necessary, by forged documents. As it was, on Sheikh Khaled’s account, Mr. de la Rosa had succeeded in imparting as little information as possible backed up by saying that confidentiality was paramount. In assessing Sheikh Khaled’s account, we think Mr. Betts’ evidence that Sheikh Khaled trusted Mr. de la Rosa and could have been persuaded to enter into a deal of the kind described, is important. It is also worth noting that it is this court’s experience that Arab business men do tend to be more trusting than their western counterparts, do not necessarily ask for documents and do not ask the same questions as English lawyers might do about any particular transaction.
54. Mr. Lyndon-Stanford contended that the fact that the money was paid by instalments supports Sheikh Khaled’s case because that is what he was told would happen by Mr. de la Rosa who was obviously behind the last minute change in instructions to the bank when he realised that they had been instructed to pay US$15m straight away. We think, as with many points which were made to us, that the fact that the money was paid by instalments is neutral. On what Sheikh Khaled says he was told by Mr. de la Rosa there was no reason to pay instalments. The profit had already been realised. If Sheikh Khaled had been part of the conspiracy he might have been anxious to conceal receipt of a large lump sum. Instalments suggesting monies coming off deposit elsewhere might look less suspicious. There was no reason to pay by instalments if the intention was to compromise Sheikh Khaled.
55. The Judge did not attach any particular significance to the payments of US$2m to Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Folchi following the meeting at Sheikh Fahad’s house in October 1992. Mr. Popplewell argues that in reality these were not loans but payments to persuade Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Folchi not to spill the beans. This is certainly an inference which could be drawn. On the other hand Sheikh Khaled says that he only made the payments at the request of Sheikh Fahad, his older and respected relative whom he addressed as "Your Excellency" or "Sheikh Fahad". On his account he had received US$20m from Mr. de la Rosa and the request to help Mr. Folchi came only from Mr. de la Rosa. If he was involved in the conspiracy he is most unlikely to have lent or given any money to Mr. de la Rosa, who received five times more than he did from Pincinco.
56. We attach little significance to Sheikh Khaled’s conversation with Mr. de la Rosa after April 1993. By that time proceedings had been started which Sheikh Khaled had been following and he knew that it was being alleged that Mr. de la Rosa was party to the misappropriation of US$300m at about the time when he had received US$20m from him. In these circumstances we do not think there is anything curious about Sheikh Khaled asking whether, in effect, the two were connected. Indeed, Mr. Lyndon-Stanford argues that this was the act of an innocent man since if he knew of the connection he would have had no need to ask the question.
57. The Judge did not accept Sheikh Khaled’s explanation for paying US$2.5m to Mr. Oberson in early 1995. He concluded, rightly in our view, that Sheikh Khaled made this payment partly in the hope that it would prevent the claimants from discovering his receipt of US$20m. By this time he knew that the US$2m which the claimants were claiming from Mr. Oberson had come from his US$20m and was therefore alleged to be part of the proceeds of the Pincinco fraud. Mr. Popplewell submits that if Sheikh Khaled was an honest man this was the moment for him to volunteer his receipt of the money to the KIO rather than pay a large sum of money to try and thwart the claimants’ attempts to trace and recover their money. Sheikh Khaled was asked questions about this by the Judge at the end of the first day of his cross-examination. Sheikh Khaled said :

I wanted to tell somebody but there is a legal confidentiality of the US$20m.

The court then adjourned and Sheikh Khaled was not asked any further questions about this. We think this is unfortunate because it appears from the context that what Sheikh Khaled was saying was that he wanted to tell someone about the US$20m but had been advised not to do so by Paul Dawson who had told him that Mr. Oberson agreed with this advice. So what he was saying was that he received legal advice not to disclose his receipt of US$20m. That is at least consistent with his evidence that he was advised that if he paid the US$2.5m to Mr. Oberson this would keep him out of the proceedings. Nevertheless the payment to Mr. Oberson is a matter which tells against Sheikh Khaled. However, it can be argued that this and Sheikh Khaled’s other subsequent conduct relied upon by the Judge were motivated by Sheikh Khaled’s realisation that his explanation for the receipt of the money sounded implausible.

58. We agree with the Judge that after the proceedings were started against him, Sheikh Khaled’s original explanation for the receipt of the money could have been more forthcoming, but he said at the time that this was on legal advice and we must accept this. His first description of the transaction that "it represented underwriting fees on an investment", was difficult to reconcile with his later account. But in this respect Mr. Betts, an experienced financial man, described the transaction referred to in Sheikh Khaled’s witness statement, as "underwriting", so there is not much in this point.
59. The Judge obviously attached some importance to his view that Sheikh Fahad might have wanted to involve Sheikh Khaled in the conspiracy to benefit him as a junior family member. No such suggestion was pleaded or put to Sheikh Khaled in cross-examination. We were informed that if asked Sheikh Khaled would have had a number of things to say which would have indicated that the Judge’s view was incorrect. This is not therefore a matter which we take into account.
60. We, of course, have not seen or heard Sheikh Khaled give evidence. But the Judge noted that his credibility had not been destroyed in the witness box. Conversely, the Judge said that the way he gave evidence had not persuaded him that his inherently improbable account was true. So the outcome of the case did not depend crucially upon how Sheikh Khaled performed in the witness box and the Judge did not have to choose between his and the evidence of other witnesses. He rejected Sheikh Khaled’s evidence because it was inherently improbable.
61. We do not agree that Sheikh Khaled’s evidence was inherently improbable for the reasons we have already given. One explanation was that the money was paid to compromise him. Another was that it was his share of the proceeds of the fraud in which he was involved. Unless we are satisfied that Sheikh Khaled’s account is untrue and so the money was not paid to compromise him, the finding of dishonesty against him cannot stand. We must be satisfied on the balance of probability, bearing in mind that the charge against Sheikh Khaled is dishonesty and also involves treachery since he is alleged to have misappropriated his country’s assets when they were most needed and it was his duty to preserve them. At the end of the day this is a jury question. Having regard to everything we have said in this judgment, we are not satisfied that Sheikh Khaled‘s explanation is untrue. It follows that we allow his appeal against the Judge’s finding that he was liable to the claimants for conspiracy and dishonest assistance.

The Respondents’ Notice - Spanish Company Law.

62. By paragraph (4) in the Respondents’ Notice, it is contended as follows:

63. Article 133 of the 1989 Act provides as follows:-

79. The judge held that Mr Folchi had rendered dishonest assistance to the conspirators in each of the Oakthorn 1, Oakthorn 2, Pincinco and Wardbase transactions, and that he was liable to account as a constructive trustee for the large sums mentioned earlier in this judgment. The judge stated that conclusion very shortly at the end of section V.3(a) of his judgment, but it was based on his lengthy analysis and findings of fact in section IV.3(g) as to Mr Folchi’s part in the matter, and on his analysis of the law earlier in section V.3(a).
80. Mr John Davies who now appears for Mr Folchi, has in his written and oral submissions attacked the judge’s conclusions on several fronts. The notice of appeal contains fifteen paragraphs of grounds, of which the first three are concerned with issues of conflict of laws. These are considered separately at the end of this judgment. All the other paragraphs are concerned with different aspects of the judge’s conclusion that Mr Folchi rendered dishonest assistance in a series of breaches of fiduciary duties, and was liable for loss caused by those breaches. Paragraphs 4 to 14 raise issues which can be roughly identified as follows, although there is a degree of overlap, since they all relate to the essential "jury question" of honesty or dishonesty: (1) whether the judge misunderstood Royal Brunei Airlines -v- Tan [1995] 2AC 378 and applied the wrong test of knowledge of a breach of trust (paras 4 to 6); (2) whether he erred in applying an objective rather than a subjective test, especially in view of Heinl -v- Jyske Bank [1999] LLR 511, the Spanish business culture, and his decision not to find that Mr Folchi was a conspirator (paras 7 to 11); (3) whether he erred on the standard of proof (para 12); (4) whether he erred on causation (paras 13 and 14); and (5) whether his conclusion on dishonesty was against the weight of the evidence (para 15, with cross-references back to paras 9, 10 and 11).
81. Apart from paragraph 15 the grounds of appeal are put forward wholly or mainly as issues of law rather than as attacks on the judge’s findings of primary fact. Mr Davies realistically recognises that he would, on well established principles, be unlikely to persuade the court to overturn such findings, especially in relation to Mr Folchi’s memorandum to the Attorney General of Kuwait. However, he has submitted that in making findings adverse to Mr. Folchi the Judge failed to give sufficient weight to a number of important background facts. The Respondents contend that the Judge should have found that Mr. Folchi was a conspirator. So it is necessary to refer to the Judge’s findings about Mr Folchi in order to be able to assess any of the grounds of appeal and deal, if necessary, with the Respondent’s notice.

 

The Judge’s Findings.

82. The judge devoted a significant part of his judgment (section IV.3(g), which runs to nearly 50 pages) to an examination of Mr Folchi’s part in the Oakthorn 1, Oakthorn 2, Pincinco and Wardbase transactions. He tested Mr Folchi’s various accounts of the matter against each other and against the documentary evidence (some of which was admittedly forged, probably by Mr de la Rosa), the evidence of other witnesses (including Mrs Parker) and the inherent probabilities. The Judge rightly attached importance to the very different accounts which Mr Folchi had given at different times, that is in his memorandum to the Attorney General of Kuwait (19 November 1992), his first witness statement (11 December 1997) and his much longer supplementary witness statement (produced very shortly before Mr Folchi gave evidence at the trial, his oral evidence being given on 11, 12 and 13 January 1999, with a very short recall on 18 January).
83. The Judge’s conclusions about Mr Folchi’s conduct are set out at the end of section IV.3(g) of the judgment. He concluded that Mr Folchi was dishonest in all four transactions on which claims were maintained against him. At that point in his judgment the Judge had not yet discussed the law at length (he dealt with the English law as to dishonest assistance in section V.3(a) and with conflict of laws issues in section V.3(b)). But he had anticipated his discussion of Royal Brunei and other authorities in a passage (relating to Mr Coll) in section IV.3(f) where he said :

........Dishonesty depends on what a person actually knew, and is, for the most part but not in every respect, to be equated in this context with conscious impropriety. The law to that extent imposes an objective standard . (original emphasis).

This shows what the judge had in mind in his later reference to objective dishonesty.

84. The Judge concluded that Mr Folchi was dishonest in relation to Oakthorn 1 especially because of his actual knowledge that US$5m was paid into account Stuart at Banker’s Trust, Geneva which Mr de la Rosa had opened shortly before. He said :

I consider that his conduct was objectively dishonest. ........ I put the matter in this way because of its relevance in the context of the claim for dishonest assistance. No honest Spanish lawyer in his position with his experience and knowledge would have implemented the instructions he received and acted as he did without a fuller understanding and assurances as to the position. Mr Folchi’s activity in Oakthorn 1, as in subsequent transactions, was characterised by willingness to make and assist in arrangements of an obviously questionable nature, without at any stage raising any questions. This went beyond any ordinary trust in and compliance with client instructions.

85. The judge reached the same conclusion, but more readily, about Mr Folchi’s part in Oakthorn 2. He said

The instructions which Mr Folchi received in respect of Oakthorn 2 were, on any view, extraordinary. This is so, even if, contrary to my view, Mr Folchi was justified in viewing the instructions to pay $5m to Mr de la Rosa in Oakthorn 1 as an understandable and regular matter which he could implement. The payments in Oakthorn 2 were of a quite different order of magnitude. They were to go to accounts in the personal names of Sheikh Fahad, in his case in London, to Mr Jaffar in Switzerland, and, indirectly for the obvious purpose of obscuring the source or trail, to Mr de la Rosa’s Stuart account. All that Mr Folchi had was a very general explanation that these were complementary payments relating to the Ebro/Agricolas merger. He had no coherent understanding what was going on, and took no step to seek any.

The Judge discounted Mr Folchi’s reliance on the standing of the recipients, pointing out that Mr Folchi later suppressed their names rather than relying on them. He concluded:

In my judgment no honest lawyer would have implemented the instructions which Mr. Folchi recounts in this transaction unquestioningly and uncomprehendingly in the manner which Mr. Folchi did. There can be no question about Mr. Folchi’s competence. An honest lawyer in his position would, to safeguard himself and his clients, have insisted on obtaining a proper understanding and assurances regarding the situation (quite possibly in writing despite the supposed confidentiality of what was occurring). If his clients would not give him this, he would have refused to become involved. I do not on the material before me conclude that Mr. Folchi became knowingly party to the scheme to injure GT or THL. But I do conclude that Mr. Folchi received and complied with instructions which conflicted on their face and in the most obvious way, with the most fundamental duties, to keep private and corporate affairs and monies separate. Despite any confidence Mr Folchi may have had in his clients and the distinction of the officers whose accounts were in question and despite the prevalence of complementary payments, I cannot view it as honest conduct for any lawyer to facilitate indirect payments from one’s client company’s accounts to unknown accounts in the names of the client company’s directors, without any clear understanding why this should be necessary or appropriate. Any other conclusion would be an invitation to fraud. Directors of previously impeccable reputation can succumb to the temptations of their stewardship. Any lawyer in Mr Folchi’s position must be taken to be aware of this risk, and I have no doubt that Mr Folchi was aware of it.

86. In relation to Pincinco the Judge took account of the exceptional circumstances of the invasion of Kuwait, and of secret war payments as a real possibility. But the size and destination of the Pincinco payments (which Mr Folchi played a major part in arranging, although he said that it was coincidence that he happened to be available in Geneva on 2 October 1990) cried out for inquiry and explanation. As the Judge said (p.250):

The Pincinco operation was also structured in a quite different, and even more opaque, manner compared to any previous operation, a change for which Mr Folchi appears to have received no explanation. After the Oakthorn 2 operation, and with knowledge of Mr de la Rosa’s involvement in the Stuart accounts and of Mr Jaffar’s account at Rud Blass, an honest lawyer in Mr Folchi’s position, and all the more a responsible director of THL, would in my judgment have insisted on a better understanding and assurances regarding such an operation before becoming involved. Recollection that the Oakthorn 1 transaction had also involved an anonymous payment to Lombard Odier, attention Thierry Lombard, would have underlined the concern of an honest lawyer in this situation. Mr Folchi did not act in this way.

The Judge also referred to Mr Folchi’s part, as he found it, in a thoroughly misleading certificate given to THL’s auditors in July 1991, which was intended to keep from them, and did keep from them, the true facts as to what had happened to the US$300m. He found that, despite his obvious intelligence and perspicacity, Mr. Folchi was much too dependent on and close to the major clients on whose business his whole firm and income had been built. The Judge thought that :

Mr. Folchi’s lack of interest in what was occurring and his unthinking and automatic implementation of extraordinary instructions were conditioned by his dependence, in every sense, on Mr. de la Rosa and the business he could yield.

87. In relation to Wardbase the judge reached the most forthright conclusion of all. He said :

In respect of the Wardbase operation Mr Folchi did in my view act dishonestly both in the sense that no honest lawyer would have acted on whatever instructions he received, and in the sense that he appreciated, at the lowest, that he was being asked to lend his assistance to an operation, which was to be executed, on Mr Folchi’s own account, by Mr de la Rosa (who was about to leave GT) in communication with Sheikh Fahad (who had already been removed as chairman of the KIO). Mr Folchi’s changing accounts at subsequent stages reflect his wish to disassociate himself as far as possible from the operation, once the plaintiffs had discovered that the documents dating from 1989 were forgeries and shams ........ The explanation of his conduct must, it seems to me, be found in a willingness to service the requirements of Mr. de la Rosa, without apparent discrimination or limit. Once again, the evidence does not, I think, justify a positive conclusion that Mr. Folchi became knowingly party to the dishonest scheme contrived by Mr. de la Rosa and others in the Wardbase transaction, although it comes close to doing so. But Mr. Folchi was prepared to and did assist Mr. de la Rosa in it in a way which an honest lawyer in his position would not have done.

88. As we have already said, Mr Davies has realistically not made any frontal assault on the Judge’s findings of primary fact against Mr Folchi. Those findings were based in part on the Judge’s assessment of Mr Folchi’s evidence as being inconsistent, vague or unconvincing on many points; on several points the Judge flatly rejected Mr Folchi’s oral evidence. The findings were also based on numerous undisputed acts or omissions by Mr Folchi which amounted to the suppression of material facts, the failure to make obvious inquiries, and the conscious participation in sham or deception. The Judge singled out some of the most significant of these:

Mr Folchi’s conduct, as I find it to have been, indicates a considerable willingness on his part to assist himself and/or others by misleading statements and by suppression of relevant information. That applies in particular to his conduct (as I find it) in respect of the Pincinco deposit audit confirmation form in July 1991, his suppression of his knowledge about the destinations or recipients of relevant payments in November 1992, the interposition of Allsports at Mr de la Rosa’s request, his general suppression of his knowledge about and involvement with the Stuart and Falcon accounts and his changes of account regarding the Wardbase transaction. In the light of such conduct, Mr Folchi’s own reaction to the instructions which he received in the various transactions cannot be any reliable guide to honest conduct.

89. Mr. Davies however, submits that the Judge drew inferences against Mr. Folchi too readily and without giving enough weight to the relevant background. This included the fact that Mr. Folchi was a highly respected and successful Spanish lawyer who had undertaken an enormous volume of work for the KIO about which there was no criticism. There was nothing exceptional about the size of the four transactions in question which were not significant in the context of GT’s business as a whole. The way the KIO worked was anachronistic, autocratic and secretive. They managed both public and private funds and made extensive use of off-shore companies and external accounts. They were prepared to make complementary payments as a way of doing business in Spain where evasion of tax and exchange control was widely tolerated as part of the business culture and they used GT to make war payments after the occupation of Kuwait. A Spanish lawyer was entitled to rely on his instructions and the doctrine of "los proprios actos" applied. The Judge should have attached great importance to the fact that the claim against Mr. Folchi in respect of Croesus was not pursued. As none of the other professionals involved was found liable for dishonest assistance the Judge gave them greater latitude than he gave Mr. Folchi.
90. We do not accept these criticisms. The Judge was well aware of these matters and took account of them in his judgment. This is illustrated by the passages from his judgment which we have quoted. He refers in detail to Mr. Folchi’s earlier career and must have had in mind the serious consequences for Mr. Folchi of any finding of dishonesty against him. He carefully considered whether the deception and suppression which Mr. Folchi participated in could be explained on the basis of complementary or war payments which, however irregular, did not amount to a fraud on KIO. But in every case he rejected that explanation and did so on adequate grounds. As to the doctrine of "los proprios actos" the expert evidence was that it always depends on the circumstances whether a third party can assume that his instructions come from someone acting within his powers and for the benefit of the company. A lawyer’s right and duty to act on his client’s instructions could be accepted as a general position or starting point, but could not be maintained as an unqualified rule, either on the expert evidence of Spanish law or as a matter of common sense. In these respects the Judge found that there was no real difference between the duties and responsibilities of a lawyer under Spanish and English law. Mr. Folchi was involved in Croesus but not in the instructions which led to the payment away of the money so there is an obvious reason why the claim against him was not pursued. The Judge’s conclusion, with which we agree, that Mr. Folchi "gained closer insight than anyone else outside the circle of conspirators into what was actually happening" explains why Mr. Folchi’s position was different from that of the other professionals .
91. Looking at the Judge’s findings of primary facts as a whole, we accept them as fair, rational and, if anything, more favourable to Mr. Folchi than they might have been.
92. But there is one important aspect of the Judge’s findings which has given rise to controversy on Mr. Folchi’s appeal. In summarising his conclusions the Judge said :

This conclusion obviously refers back to the section V.1 (d) of the judgment where the Judge dealt with the claims for conspiracy against these Defendants. He referred to the conclusions he had reached earlier in his judgment that "a number of Defendants" had not knowingly been party to any dishonest scheme to abstract monies from GT, but had been involved to a greater or lesser extent in producing false documentation and other improper conduct and then said :

A little later in the judgment when considering whether the conspiracy claim was actionable in Spain, the Judge said that the transactions had to be viewed in the light of his conclusions that Sheikh Fahad, Mr. Jaffar and Mr. de la Rosa were involved in misappropriation of others’ monies but that :

146. We allow Sheikh Khaled’s appeal. The judgment against him will be set aside.
147. Mr. Folchi’s appeal is dismissed.

(Order does not form part of approved judgment)