Date:
Wed, 21 Jun 2006 11:40:09
From:
Jason Neyers
Subject:
Fiduciary Duty
I
post on behalf of Joshua Getzler:
May
I add some detail on the conflict of duty and duty that arose in
the House of Lords case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood
[2005] UKHL 8; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 567.
I
noted this case in (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 1 and won't repeat the entire
analysis here. In Hilton a firm of solicitors acted for
both sides of a land sale and did not disclose to the seller, Mr
Hilton, who was a longtime client, that the buyer had criminal fraud
convictions and was not to be trusted; those very solicitors knew
the whole story having represented the buyer in the earlier fraud
trial. When the buyer defaulted on the sale this caused the seller's
various development projects to collapse, eventually wiping out
the seller's small building business. The seller sued the solicitors
for failing to keep their fiduciary duty to protect him; they riposted
that it would be a breach of duty to their other client to reveal
bad things about him. The court held, in the special contractual-fiduciary
arena of solicitors' duties to clients, that it is an automatic
breach of duty to put oneself into a situation of conflict of duty
and duty, and if one chooses to cause harm through breaching duty
to one client and keeping faith with another, one pays out in full
to the betrayed client. Implied consent or implicit waiver was a
major line of defence but was rejected by the Lords on basis of
there being no possibility here of informed consent to non-disclosure
of fraud.
I
agree with Lionel's comment on Kelly v Cooper that some
saw the decision as being too quick to conflict of duty and duty
through implicit waiver; I'm certainly in that camp. Kelly v
Cooper was not mentioned in Hilton, but I see the
later Lords' decision as clipping the wings of the earlier somewhat
adventurist case from the Privy Council. Certainly Lord Browne-Wilkinson
in Kelly may have mistranscribed Mason CJ's theory in Hospital
Products that contractual contexts can mould fiduciary duties
and reduce the intensity and scope of duties; I read Mason CJ as
wanting fiduciary duties to push up contractual standards, not the
other way around with contract eviscerating the effect of fiduciary
duty. The court in Hilton may have been tougher in applying
fiduciary duties than in Kelly because the solicitors advising
Mr Hilton had, in addition to assuming conflicting duties, also
concealed a degree of self-dealing and had clearly favoured the
buyer in the negotiations and taken an active role in preferring
one client over another.
Lord
Walker, whose speech was backed by the other Law Lords in Hilton,
went closely into the nature of a solicitor's fiduciary disclosure
duties in the common case of acting simultaneously for mortgage
lender and buyer. Lord Walker also - strictly obiter - approved
the obiter comments of Millett LJ on fiduciary duties in Bristol
and West BS v Mothew [1998] Ch. 1. The Hon. Justice Dyson Heydon
noted the pyramid of obiter statements piled up before and around
Mothew's case in his essay 'Are the Duties of Company Directors
to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?' in Simone Degeling and James
Edelman, editors, Equity and Commercial Law (Thomson 2005),
just reviewed by Charles Mitchell in the LQR for July 2006. With
Hilton the pyramid of obiters got bigger.
Joshua
--
Jason Neyers
January Term Director
Associate Professor of Law
Faculty of Law
University of Western Ontario
N6A 3K7
(519) 661-2111 x. 88435
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