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This is a follow
up to the mailings from Andrew Dickinson and Paul Todd.
My Lexis research produced 44 cases from 1971 to 1999
in which change of position was discussed (my search term, in ALLCAS,
was <"change of position" and enrichment>). Of those, a large
number are the cases we would expect to see (Kleinwort
Benson, Goss v Chilcott,
Westdeutsche, Svenska,
South Tyneside, Lipkin Gorman, Barclays v W J Simms). There are some others
which are interesting and which do not appear in Paul Todd's list.
One of those is Euroactividade AG v Moeller and others, CA, 1 February
1995 (unreported). The first and second defendants were Mr and Mrs Moeller,
both of whom were directors of the Liechtenstein-registered plaintiff
company (the main business of the company was developing golf courses
around the world). The claim against the first defendant (Mr Moeller)
was for misappropriation of company funds. There were allegations that
funds of the company had been transferred to a joint bank account no 968
held by the first defendant and second defendant (Mrs Moeller). It appears
that the claim against the second defendant was mainly one for money had
and received (based on the fact that she was the joint holder of the bank
account). Summary judgment for recovery of the money was given in favour
of the plaintiffs by Jacob J; various grounds of appeal were made out
before the Court of Appeal.
The second defendant raised a change of position defence. It appears
that there had been a number of payments made from account 968 back to
the company. The explanation given was that the payments to and from account
968 were part of a scheme to minimise the company's tax liability. An
incidental argument was raised to the effect that the payments back should
be deducted from the amount of the judgment given by the court in favour
of the plaintiffs. The position of the judge at first instance, supported
by Simon Brown LJ, was that the payments back should not be accounted
for in the instant claim. Instead, the defendants should seek to recover
them in a separate action, based on the *flexible doctrine of unjust enrichment
... such a cause of action is available whenever payments are made without
consideration, there being no intention to make a gift* (no comment! I
think this is arguably obiter).
The argument for the second defendant was that the payments back could
in any case be the basis for a change of position defence. The payments
were made out of the joint account by the first defendant. The Court of
Appeal seems to have accepted that *the second defendant's husband changed
her [the second defendant's] position by making payment to the plaintiffs
of substantial sums that had initially been paid into account 968*. Simon
Brown LJ continues: *Let me for present purposes assume that to be a sufficient
change of position in law to satisfy that aspect of the matter*. The practical
difficulty for the second defendant was the absence of evidence of good
faith on her part. On that basis the defence was rejected.
The analysis of the Court of Appeal is interesting. There are two points.
First, the Court of Appeal sees the defence as having two distinct elements
- the (factual) change of position, and the element of good faith. The
question perhaps remains as to whether the requirement of good faith relates
to the initial receipt or the change of position. Distinguishing between
them may be difficult. The second point is that the Court of Appeal appears
to recognise constructive change of position, or perhaps change of position
by proxy (that D2's position may be changed by the actings of D1 operating
on the joint bank account).
Other interesting cases are:
Lloyds
Bank v Independent Insurance, CA, [1999] 2 WLR 986 The last case is quite an interesting and novel one (or at least appears
to be from a cursory reading of the Kwic print from Lexis). In the course
of the decision of the appeal tribunal it is noted that *I fear that the
mistaken assumption that mere expenditure of money may be regarded as
amounting to a change of position for present purposes has led in the
past to opposition by some to recognition of a defence which in fact is
likely to be available only on comparatively rare occasions*.
This leads nicely to Andrew's question about the lack of development
of the defence. There may be a number of reasons for the paucity of authority,
none of which may be particularly satisfying.
The requirement of good faith may be, quite correctly, the main problem
for defendants. If the defendant's receipt is tainted by bad faith (or
lack of good faith, which may relate to the quality of the knowledge possessed
by the defendant relating to the receipt), that element of bad faith may
colour the subsequent change of position. I suspect that the advice given
to the majority of defendants in that position is that the defence is
not worth running. The simple question may be: did you reasonably believe
that you were entitled to the payment received? This may admittedly be
easier to answer in the affirmative in relation to claims based on plaintiff-sided
unjust factors (where the conduct or knowledge of the defendant is not
so much in focus).
The other reason why the defence may be difficult to establish is that
plaintiffs may be much quicker these days in putting potential defendants
on notice that the transfer (and therefore the enrichment) will be subject
to challenge. This may not give the defendant time to change their position.
As I have noted, these may not be wholly satisfying reasons.
I am also bound to note that the old Scots case of Credit Lyonnais v
George Stevenson & Co Ltd, 1901, 9 SLT 93, provides authority for the
existence of the defence (although there was no detailed exposition of
it there).
Scott
Solicitor, Glasgow <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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