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Thank you for your reply, and your misunderstanding is indeed not surprising because it is one shared by many. Scots law is in a period of academic and judicial rationalisation, and the condictio causa data, causa non secuta is a part of that ongoing debate. As far as the authority of Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. 1923 S.L.T. 624, i would say that the case is seriously doubted by modern academics, not only in its decision, but in its exposition of the condictio causa data causa non secuta. The debate is too lengthy and problematic to discuss here, but i would refer you to two excellent articles by Professor R. Evans-Jones: Unjustified Enrichment, Contract, and The Third Reception of Roman Law in Scotland. 1993 LQR, and also Roman Law in Scotland and England: Developing one law of Britain 1999 LQR.

Secondly you said.

"My first difficulty is that, whereas I understand you to say the condictio causa data applies where the purpose which fails is outwith contract, my understanding of both Viscount Stair and Lord President Rodger is simply that, whether or not the purpose which fails is within, the liability which warrants repetition is outwith, contract"

This is in fact an understandable interpretation, but it was not a point that was really of concern to the Lord President in Shilliday v Smith. Again, the analysis of the problem is complex, but certainly it would seem that although the liability that warrants repetition is within contract, it has persuasively been argued that the ground of repetition is not the unjustified enrichment remedy of causa data causa non secuta.(See an article by R. Evans-Jones, The Dark Side of Connelly v Simpson. 1994(?) JR). This will be seen from the articles above which i have referred you to. Let me try and expose the problems with an example, which i find always to be of help. Let's say i contract with you a director of a company to buy some shares at a value of £1000 which will be delivered at a postponed date. Let's imagine that first the director does not in fact deliver the shares, and that secondly the company becomes insolvent. The shares are now worth £10. If i sue for damages for the directors material breach i can only recover to the extent of my loss, the £10, but in fact i have in anticipation of the contract being performed paid £1000 to the director. So, by what mechanism is the money to be repaid? The liability in repetition to repay is not the condictio causa data causa non secuta, that is clear from Shilliday v Smith, and also a case worth noting, Connelly v Simpson 1994 S.L.T. 1096. The answer most probably is that repetition should simply be seen as a remedy within contract to recover pre-payments in cases of material breach. It is functionally better that the law of contract resolves these matters for itself. Scots law in this area is in need of further clarification by the courts, and i feel i can do little more to help you in this regard. Concededly there is House of Lords authority in Cantiere San Rocco, to the effect that pre-payments are recoverable by condictio causa data causa non secuta where the contract has been frustrated by supervening impossibility. If you read closely the passage from the Lord President in Shilliday v Smith - "this is a useful reminder that, even if in Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. 1923 S.L.T. 624 the House of Lords included certain situations relating to the non-performance of a contract under the heading of the condictio causa data" - i think you will agree that what Lord Rodger is doing is having a subtle sideswipe at the decision, and carefully iterating the point that the condictio causa data causa non secuta only applies to situations outwith contract. Therefore, in Shilliday v Smith, it was services and property given in contemplation of marriage.

The second of your confusions in relation to the meaning and scope of sine causa is not unsurprising. This is because its potential in scots law has not been realised, and its scope and applicability have yet to be coherently delineated. Part of your confusion is because Stair in the passage which you quote, and which appears in the opinion of the Lord President in Shilliday, is rather too loose with the way in which he presents causa data, and sine causa. The two are unified by the notion that where the "cause cease by which they become ours" they must be restored. The difference between causa data and sine cause is actually pedantic in this context. Causa data is simply the genus of "cause" relating to to future events. Thus the definition of causa data as recovery of benefit for a future purpose which fails. Sine causa does not apply in this context because the cause for which the benefit confers is not undone by the failure of some future purpose to materialise, but by some other factor, say the mistake of the transferor, but where nonetheless, the "cause" or basis of the transfer does not in fact exist. If the distinction is not clear it is because in truth it is one that Scots law has yet to expose at all. Sine causa generally has an elusive and poorly defined status in Scots Law, but i think if you look at the 10th ed of Gloag and Hendersons, Introduction to the Laws of Scotland, you will find some assistance. It would seem that sine cause is simply a residual category which embraces situations where the condictio indebit does not apply perhaps because the transfer of the enrichment was not one legally due.

If all of this has been puzzling it is because a lot of work is being done by academics and the courts to rationalise Scots Law in this area. I hope i have been of some help.