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RDG
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Further to Lionel's message, I would agree that I am
expressing [myself] in terms of the
analytical framework & in terms of what must be pled, rather than in
terms of how the issue would actually present itself to the trial judge.
But I would reply that the analytical framework set out
by Lord Nicholls, and the way in which presumed UI cases are pled, are
important. Of course, in practice all the relevant evidence is going to
be argued over by the parties in one way or another, and the judge is
going to have to take a view on what he thinks really happened.
But what worries me is that Lord Nicholls places great
emphasis on the whereabouts of the burden of proof, envisages that once
a claimant has fulfilled his two initial requirements, she can sit back
and make the defendant disprove UI, but appears to build into his second
(manifest disadvantage) requirement the expectation that the claimant
must prove UI in order to demonstrate that the transaction was manifestly
disadvantageous to her.
If this is right, then the burden of proof won't be switched
to the defendant until the court has decided the central issue in the
claimant's favour, and put this issue beyond disproof. This follows from
the fact that before the burden of proof switches to the defendant, the
claimant must first of all have discharged the initial burden of proof
which lies on her to prove that she was unduly influenced, and once the
claimant has persuaded a court of this, the defendant can't disprove UI
without getting the court to contradict itself.
Charles
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