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RDG
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the lender [sanwa] delivers a financing check to its
customer [alpha] but the check is payable to the prospective supplier
[finchill]. Supplier, rather than customer, is made payee to insure that
customer doesn't walk off with the money without acquiring the asset.
finchill's act of endorsing the check over to Alpha
would seem wrong to the business community because it defeats the purpose
of designating the prospective supplier as payee
whatever the proper legal classification of that wrong,
can finchill be taken off the hook by characterizing its act of misusing
the check as unjust enrichment and that very act as change of position?
Charles Mitchell wrote:
It has been suggested by some, e.g. Gareth Jones, that
the change of position defence should be available in some circumstances
to a defendant sued for conversion. Sanwa
v Finchill comes close to saying this, but it doesn't quite get there.
The facts went like this. Sanwa was told by Alpha
- untruthfully - that Alpha wished to buy goods from Finchill. Sanwa
agreed to finance this transaction by way of a lease agreement. At Alpha's
request, Finchill sent an invoice for the goods to Sanwa. Sanwa then
issued a cheque to Finchill and gave it to Alpha for delivery to Finchill.
However, Alpha then told Finchill - again untruthfully - that it had
been able to obtain the goods elsewhere, that it did not wish to buy
the goods from Finchill after all, and that it wished Finchill to endorse
the cheque over to Alpha. Finchill complied with this request.
Thereafter, Alpha paid Sanwa some money under the
terms of the lease agreement, but it eventually came to light that Alpha
had never bought the goods from Finchill, and that the whole business
was a fraud by Alpha designed to extract money out of Sanwa. Finchill
was not implicated in this fraud, but was, like Sanwa, an innocent victim
of Alpha's fraudulent misrepresentations.
Because Alpha and Finchill never entered a contract
for the purchase of the goods, there was in the view of the NSWCA no
substratum on which a contractual relationship between Sanwa and Finchill
could be said to exist. However, the NSWCA considered that Alpha could
recover the amount of the cheque from Finchill, either in an action
for conversion or in an action for unjust enrichment (apparently on
the ground of mistake; the 'enrichment' received by Finchill was title
to the cheque which it endorsed over to Alpha).
The question then arose, whether Finchill had any
defences to either claim, and Davies AJA said this:
'In my opinion, the payments which Sanwa ... received
from Alpha must be taken into account whether or not the cause of action
be looked at as damages for conversion of the cheques or recoupment
of unjust enrichment on the part of Finchill. In either event, there
was a loose circle of moneys flowing from [Sanwa] to Finchill to Alpha
and back to [Sanwa]. Insofar as restitution is concerned, it would be
unjust not to take these payments into account. Insofar as damages are
concerned, the money received reduced the amount of [Sanwa's] loss.'
This decision does not quite say that because Finchill
was disenriched when it endorsed the cheque to Alpha it had changed
its position and should be entitled to rely on this fact in defence
to the conversion and UE claims, since Davies AJA held that Finchill
was entitled to a defence only insofar as the value inherent in the
cheques found its way back into Sanwa's hands. However, I doubt whether
that can really be correct in principle, at least so far as the change
of position defence to the UE claim is concerned, although it obviously
makes more sense when presented as a reason for reducing the tort damages
payable to Sanwa, to compensate Sanwa for its loss.
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