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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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fergus farrow
wrote:
.....we have had great difficulty appreciating
that an informally-evidenced intention to release is binding (and should
be enforceable). Moreover, it should be binding because a release of a
debt is tantamount to the creditor making a gift to the debtor of the
amount owing, thereby enabling the debtor to pay the debt, with the gift
and the repayment being in the nature of an accounting set-off. the following indented item is from an earlier ms. from
mr farrow:
...The binding intentions principle also helps
us to understand the void contract issue. If the principle is applied
to an illegal gambling agreement it can be argued that the bettor can
not have manifested an intention, in his jurisdiction, to acquire a
binding legal obligation to pay, and hence could not have discharged
such an obligation by paying. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances that the bettor manifested by his conduct
an irrevocable (and lawful) intention to make a gift to his bookmaker,
in a situation where he held a reasonable expectation that his bookmaker,
if he were to stay in business, would make a reciprocal gift, at odds,
should the bettor's horse come home.... back to the taxonomic part of the current discussion,
the word 'gift' does uncomfortable double duty if applied in legal talk
both to name the normal transaction of mr. fergus' basic intent definition,
and also to characterize a transaction-affirming outcome for questioned
exchange relationships, eg those involving bookie and better, or the even
more uncongenial debtor-and-creditor <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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